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Redevelopment
Sheila R. Foster
Brian Glick

INTRODUCTION

Social justice movements have long attempted to influence the economic
development of urban communities. Racial, ethnic, and class factions have
chronically struggled over land, jobs, housing, and political power, particularly
in cities. Studies of the development and decline of many cities-Camden,
Oakland, Chicago, Detroit, and New Haven, for example--over the last halfcentury tell much the same story. The convergence of political and economic
forces that built up cities across the country ultimately disintegrated, crippling
many cities and leaving their inhabitants to fight over a racially and
economically stratified turf that could not compete with the surrounding
suburbs for critical resources.' The Community Economic Development (CED)
1.

See generally

HOWARD

GILLETTE, JR., CAMDEN

RENEWAL IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY

AFTER

THE FALL: DECLINE

AND

(2005) (chronicling the history of, and examining the

cumulative effects of, urban decline in a classic post-industrial city); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING
THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-i960

(1998) (chronicling the

strategies used by Chicago's ethnic, political, and business interests in reaction to the great
migration of southern blacks in the 1940s and describing how the violent reaction of an emergent
"white" population combined with public policy to segregate the city); DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY:
URBANISM AND ITS END (2003) (chronicling the rise and fall of New Haven, Connecticut, from its
industrial heyday through its gradual and then precipitous decline, from the early 20th century to
the present day); ROBERT 0.

SELF, AMERICAN

BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE

FOR

POSTWAR OAKLAND (2003) (telling the story of the postwar rise and decline of cities through
Oakland and its nearby suburbs by tracing both the history of civil rights and black power politics
as well as the history of suburbanization and home-owner politics); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE
ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996) (explaining
how Detroit and many other once prosperous industrial cities have become the sites of persistent
racialized poverty, brought about by changes in the urban economy and labor market and by racial
and class segregation), As Gillette poignantly characterizes this history:
[T]he New Deal ties forged between disparate constituencies around entitlements to
decent wages and a secure home came unraveled in the postwar years. Not only did the
number of well-paying union jobs decline as industries migrated away from older urban
areas, housing support to those in greatest need declined too, even as subsidies
increased for those who already had significant resources to buy homes in preferred
locations. Both policy elements assumed stark spatial dimensions. As jobs decentralized
and as federally financed loans underwrote the rapid growth of the suburbs, what
publicly assisted housing was available was directed at older cities, causing both
controversy and, eventually, inadequate housing options for the African Americans and
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movement arose out of the resulting struggle of urban residents, particularly
those in distressed inner cities, to access public and2 private capital to build and
operate essential community facilities and services.
Although its historical origins and orientations are different from those of
the CED movement, the environmental justice movement similarly emerged
from the struggle of socially and economically vulnerable populations to secure
and improve the quality of the places where they lived, worked, and played.3
Environmental justice advocates have long been fighting the widespread
tendency of public officials to promote economic growth around the perimeter
of socially and economically vulnerable communities and to impose harmful
externalities of that growth--often toxic and hazardous land uses--on those
communities. Dana Alston, a pioneer of the United States environmental justice
movement, once stated that the centerpiece of environmental injustice across
the world is that "[t]he people who benefit the most from technological and
industrial development do not have to bear as much of the burden."4 To counter
these inequities, environmental justice advocates question and closely
scrutinize the type of land uses that communities of color and low-income
communities are asked to accept, often in the name of economic development.
Such scrutiny renders the environmental justice movement a natural ally of the
CED movement. 5 This alliance seems even more appropriate in light of the
other minority populations whose mobility remained strictly limited by racial or
economic discrimination.... Despite the promise that all Americans could become full

participants in a post-World War I1'consumer republic,' ... the distribution of benefits
in a robust market economy was extremely uneven. For those who made it to the
suburbs, housing value came to be considered the key to security, and any changes that
threatened to undercut that investment had to be resisted, including economic and racial
diversity..
GILLETTE, supra note 1, at 4-5.
2. See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001) (examining evolution of
community economic development movement, including analysis of its operating premises and

strategies); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics:
Toward a GrassrootsMovement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001) [hereinafter
Cummings, Toward a GrassrootsMovement].
3. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND Up: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 19-33 (2001) (explaining
that the environmental justice movement grew organically out of many local struggles and events
and social movements, including the civil rights, anti-toxics, labor and environmental

movements); see also Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic
Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 302, 303
(Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) [hereinafter Cummings, Mobilization

Lawyering] (noting that CED "is not connected with broad-based social movements" but instead is
"parochial, seeking to preserve community boundaries and increase community control of
resources," and as such is not "designed to challenge the existing rules of the game").
4. Bobby Peek, Dir., Groundwork, Introduction at the Environmental Justice Forum: Speak
Out! (Aug. 25, 2001), available at http://www.groundwork.org.za/Pamphlets/EJ%20Forum.htm

(last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
5. Rachel Godsil and James Freeman made this argument over a decade ago. See Rachel D.
Godsil & James S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees, and Autonomy: The Convergence of the Environmental
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an "accountable development" strand of activism within the CED
emergence of
6
movement.
It is true that most environmental justice organizations work largely
around reactive struggles against the environmentally unsustainable decisions
others make that shape the character and decrease the quality of their
surrounding communities. Lawyers working with environmental justice
organizations must often operate from a reactive position, responding to a
decision made largely without the affected community's input. Because
environmental justice campaigns take place within the very legal/regulatory
context that results in the disproportionate siting of noxious and polluting
facilities in communities of color, lawyers are crucial to the organizations. The
lawyer-client relationships are almost always undertaken with appropriate
caution, however. Following the groundbreaking work of Luke Cole, lawyers
often carefully situate themselves as a complement to, rather than as a leading
force behind, the environmental justice group's ultimate strategy for increasing
the community's role in future land use and development decisions.7
More recently, however, environmental justice groups have begun to turn
their attention toward proactively developing, advocating, and securing policy
shifts and new practices on the ground to (re)build their communities into ones
that are both socially just and ecologically sustainable. Indeed, the emerging
framework of "just sustainability" comes out of a fusion of newer sustainable8
development principles with more traditional environmental justice principles.
In his work, Julian Agyeman points to the development of a practice, or

Justice Movement and Community Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 25,
47 (1994).

6. Environmental justice activists tend to have a social movement orientation employing
direct action and seeking structural reforms as a way to alleviate many of the problems, including
environmental degradation, that their communities endure. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at

33-34. The emerging advocacy within the CED movement for "accountable development" also
focuses on "more confrontational forms of collective action, flowing out of the traditions of
community organizing and social movement activism." Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering supra
note 3, at 303 (contrasting this recent focus with the traditional CED strategy of building

"partnerships and distribut[ing] resources within the framework of the law as constituted" and
fostering "a version of mobilization that tends to de-emphasize adversarial organizing in favor of
collaboration with business and governmental partners."); see also id. at 313 (stating that the
emergence of an "accountable development" strand within CED practice has "sought to change
city redevelopment practices through more confrontational grassroots campaigns aimed at

increasing community participation in the planning process and forcing local developers and
government officials to commit to redevelopment projects that are responsible to the needs of lowincome residents").
7. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992) [hereinafter Cole, Empowerment as
the Key]; see also Luke W. Cole, Community Initiatives:Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and
Grassroots Activists: Three Models of EnvironmentalAdvocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687 (1995)
[hereinafter Cole, Macho Law Brains].
8.

JULIAN

AGYEMAN,

SUSTAINABLE

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 79-106 (2005).

COMMUNITIES

AND

THE

CHALLENGE

OF
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perhaps "praxis," 9 of just sustainability exemplified by the work of many
environmental justice organizations around the country, including Boston's
Alternatives for Community and Environment (ACE) and Oakland's
Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), among others. These
organizations employ direct, participatory, and collaborative strategies to
address the range of environmental health, land use, housing, and transportation
issues in their communities.10 In determining the kinds of land use, jobs,
services, and housing that should accompany redevelopment, these groups not
only reactively fight against unwanted development, but they also work
affirmatively to build and create "the ability, opportunity, capacity, and
wherewithal to chart their [communities'] own destiny.""
The fusion of some of the concepts, strategies, goals, and practices of the
environmental justice, community economic development, and sustainable
development movements presents intriguing challenges for lawyers
representing organizations at the intersection of these frameworks. The
proactive role that many environmental justice groups increasingly assume
complicates, or at least changes, the traditional role that lawyers have assumed
in advocating for these organizations. Becoming proactive players now requires
the organization to envision the type of development that will best serve its
constituents and obtain the tools to implement that vision, including extracting
community benefits from private developers who supply the development
capital.
This shift from defending and reacting to creating and envisioning
requires a more engaged organizational role for the lawyer. The lawyer is now
expected to do more than translate the organization/community's grievance into
discreet legal frameworks and discourse---e.g., a civil rights violation, a
nuisance, participatory right, etc. The lawyer now intervenes in negotiations
from which the organization or community has been excluded. 12 This new role
requires a shifting, flexible mix of skills and a more dynamic interaction with
9. See, e.g., id. (borrowing the intragenerational justice and equity focus from
environmental justice activism and the ecological planning aspects from sustainability
development; the "just sustainability" model is exemplified by the work of organizations that
proactively attend to constructing, advocating, and securing larger policy shifts and actions to
(re)build their communities into ones that are both socially just and ecologically sustainable); see
also Eric E. Yamamoto, CriticalRace Praxis: Race Theory and PoliticalLawyering Practice in
Post-CivilRights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821, 829-30 (1997) ("Critical race praxis combines
critical, pragmatic, socio-legal analysis with political lawyering and community organizing to
practice justice by and for racialized communities. Its central idea is that racial justice requires
antisubordination practice. In addition to ideas and ideals, justice is something experienced
through practice").
10. See Julian Agyeman & Briony Angus, The Role of Civic Environmentalism in the
Pursuitof SustainableCommunities, 46 J.ENVTL. POL'Y & MGMT. 345, 345 (2003).
11. AGYEMAN, supra note 8, at 141 (quoting Bill Shutkin's description of Alternatives for
Community and Environment's "theory of change" as an example of an articulation of just

sustainability).
12.

See, e.g., Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3, at 309.
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the organization and its varied functions-policy, community education,
lobbying, and organizing. 13 This new role is what we call "integrative
lawyering," an emergent model of community lawyering that we identify and
explore in the context of our experience working for and with an environmental
justice organization, West Harlem Environmental Action (WE ACT) in New
York City. 4
WE ACT has changed over time from ad hoc, pro bono legal
representation to an ongoing multi-faceted collaboration with Fordham Law
School faculty and students to now also employing an in-house attorney. Sheila
Foster, an environmental justice scholar, came to Fordham in 2002 and began
to serve as legal consultant and pro bono counsel in WE ACT's campaign
against the City's uptown concentration of asthma-inducing diesel bus garages.
She linked WE ACT with Brian Glick's CED clinic at Fordham, which soon
became the group's transactional counsel. Since then, WE ACT also has
received assistance from students and faculty in Fordham's urban policy clinic,
its advanced public interest seminar, and its new environmental justice
externship program. Working with Fordham, the organization recently won a
multi-year grant to add an in-house staff attorney. In its application, WE ACT
advanced a model that integrates legal capacity directly into a community
organization (rather than collaborating with independent legal organizations or
counsel), so that legal research, analysis and action could inform and enhance
all aspects of the group's planning and action.
We argue that "integrative lawyering" has emerged at WE ACT, and at
similar organizations working at the intersection of environmental justice and
sustainable development, partly through the efforts of lawyers and community
based organizations to intervene in, and respond to, the political and economic
dynamics of contemporary urban development. We illustrate how these
dynamics play out within the context of an ongoing and contested proposal by
Columbia University in New York City to build a new campus in another major
part of West Harlem, thereby threatening nearby communities with grave
environmental, economic, social, and development consequences. WE ACT has
been thrust into the center of this controversial development project and has
consequently moved more deeply into the vortex of city development politics
than ever before. WE ACT's intense involvement in planning, developing,
resourcing, and negotiating the community response to the University's
proposal exposes the limitations of relying exclusively on legal/regulatory tools
to extract gains for community interests from the thick political economy of
urban development. This experience also illuminates the demands placed on
lawyers operating in this new context to fully and dynamically engage in and
with the entire range of an organization's multi-faceted efforts.
13. See id.
14. See West Harlem Environmental Action (WE ACT) for Environmental Justice,
http://www.weact.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
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In Part II we sketch Columbia University's proposed expansion in West
Harlem, the contested issues surrounding the proposal, and WE ACT's role as
an emerging force in Harlem's redevelopment and revitalization. We illustrate
how WE ACT's efforts to galvanize a multi-faceted response to Columbia's
proposals and to shape the overall trajectory of development in Harlem have
moved it squarely and firmly into the realm of local development politics. This
move, we argue, requires a set of strategies that will test not only the
organization's expertise but also its lawyers' roles within the organization.
In Part III, we articulate a framework for understanding the political
economy of urban development that WE ACT must navigate in organizing a
community response to Columbia's expansion plan. We argue in this section
that the decentralization of political power and capital in urban development
has significantly shifted the roles of public and private players in development
deals. We demonstrate how the city/local government has become a weaker
player in a more dispersed system of influence/power that drives urban
development today, while communities now view themselves as potential
players in the development "game."
In Part IV, we delve more deeply into the political, economic, and legal
dynamics surrounding Columbia's expansion by identifying the various
stakeholders, their interests, and the various points of convergence and
divergence among them. We then detail the ways in which these players
interact, compete, and collude through various stages of legal process and
discourse at multiple levels of government. At each stage, we show how WE
ACT has reexamined and redefined its lawyering strategies in response to the
thick political economy in which contemporary development deals proceed in
the shadow of the law.
In Part V, we argue that to be effective in navigating the political and
economic forces illustrated in the WE ACT case study, community lawyers
need to work "integratively" in two interconnected ways: "role integration" and
"organizational integration." At the level of role integration, WE ACT's
lawyers, like their client, need to integrate a broad range of practice areas,
skills, and roles when seeking to build/enhance community efficacy. And at the
level of organizational integration, they also need to ensure that their work is
thoroughly integrated into the overall strategy, programs, and processes of the
community based organization so that their lawyering ties closely with the
organization's efforts to build community capacity and power. 15 We conclude
this Part by identifying the ways that WE ACT's legal team has been working
with its organizers and other staff members to synthesize the organization's
legal, education, policy, and lobbying efforts toward the creation of new
structures for community ownership of land, housing, and other facilities that

15. By community efficacy, we mean the capacity and ability of those who have the least
voice in the development process to develop and implement a shared vision of its future.
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its constituents seek to gain from the expansion project. Although the Columbia
expansion project is ongoing and remains contested, the model of integrative
lawyering that is developing at WE ACT yields immediate lessons that
transcend this particular dispute.
I
A MODERN TALE OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT: THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
EXPANSION

In July 2003, Columbia announced its thirty-year plan to build an
eighteen-acre science and arts complex in West Harlem just north of its historic
Morningside Heights campus and two miles south of its uptown medical
center. 16 Columbia already had purchased nearly half of the site and expected
to acquire the other half through private sales, or from City and State agencies
that owned large parcels in the proposed footprint.' 7 Columbia's announcement
set in motion a complex, multi-level political-economic process and struggle
that carried the potential to change not only the University and surrounding
community but also an important community group, WE ACT, and the roles of
its legal team.
A. The University
By July 2007, Columbia controlled all but a very few properties on the
proposed expansion site. Its evolving plan for the new campus had expanded to
include a new business school, student and staff housing , and an underground
gym and pool. 18 The move made very good sense for the University. Columbia
16. See Charles V. Bagli, Columbia Buys Sites and Assures Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2004, at B8 [hereinafter Bagli, Columbia Buys Sites]; Charles V. Bagli, Columbia, in a
Growth Spurt, Is Buying a Swath of Harlem, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at AI (hereinafter Bagli,
Columbia in a Growth Spurt].
17. See Bagli, Columbia in a Growth Spurt, supra note 16.
18. See N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING., MANHATTANVILLE IN WEST HARLEM
REZONING

AND

ACADEMIC

MIXED-USE

DEVELOPMENT

DRAFTr

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

STATEMENT Ch. I at 42 (2007) (hereinafter COLUMBIA DRAFT EIS], available at
http://nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/envreview/manhattanville.shtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (stating
that Subdistrict A of the planned campus would include classrooms, scientific research facilities
including laboratories, housing for graduate students, faculty, and other employees, recreational
facilities including a swimming and diving center and related support space); David J. Craig,
at
2006,
8
at
12,
available
COLUM.
MAG.,
June
Smart
Growth,
http://www.neighbors.columbia.edu/ pages/manplanning/pdf-files/columbia-mag-june06.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3, 2007) (stating that the underground facility would contain pools, parking, and
maintenance facilities); Columbia'sMove on West Harlem, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 14, at
11 (reporting that the new campus would include the business school as well as new science labs
and an art and culture center); Douglas Feiden, Columbia Launches Land-Grab Plan: Many in
West Harlem Would Be Booted from their Homes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 2007, at 20
(reporting that the new campus would include dormitories as well as, potentially, a pool and even
a hotel). Columbia expects the project to take 25-30 years and cost at least $7 billion. See Daphne
Eviatar, The Way We Live Now: 5-21-06: Dispute; The ManhattanvilleProject,N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2006, § 6 (Mag.), at 632. The first phase of the project initially was to incorporate the School
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is in constant competition with the other Ivy League schools as well as its
downtown rival New York University. These universities compete for students,
faculty, staff, funding, media attention, rankings, and much more. 19 The other
Ivy League and top national schools have far more space than Columbia, 20 and
Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania, the two other big city
Ivies, had recently completed major expansions. 2' To remain competitive,
Columbia had to keep up.
Expanding north into more of West Harlem was the obvious and only real
option for such growth near the University's existing facilities. Columbia and
allied institutions already used the narrow strip adjoining the Hudson River and
Riverside Park on its west. Any attempt to clear a major site in the densely
residential neighborhoods of Central Harlem to the east or the Upper West Side
to the south would involve huge political as well as financial costs. The
University was very concerned to keep peace with nearby communities,
especially Harlem. It would go to great lengths-short of not expanding-to
avoid repeating the traumatic events of Spring 1968, when its plan to build a
gymnasium on the hill separating Morningside Heights from Central Harlem
sparked angry community protest and22a widely publicized, week-long student
occupation of main campus buildings.
of the Arts and some research space on Broadway itself. Bagli, Columbia in a Growth Spurt,
supra note 16. The plans remain preliminary. See Eviatar, supra note 18. The Greene Science
Center and the magnet school, however, are scheduled for the first phase. See Craig, supra note
18.
19. By Columbia's calculations, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton each have more than double
the square feet of space per student, according to planning documents. Jarrett Murphy, History
Lesson, THE VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), May 24, 2006, at 14; see also Craig, supra note 18, at 10
(stating that "[a]mong the Ivies, CU has the fewest square feet per student, with just half that of its
most space-constrained peer, Harvard"). Its rivals' science research labs and performing arts
venues, and their housing, gym and other facilities, are ever more lavish and up-to date. See Bagli,
Columbia in a Growth Spurt, supra note 16.
20. See Bagli, Columbia Buys Sites, supra note 16; see also Craig, supra note 18, at 10
(noting a general trend towards campus construction in the last decade).
21. See, e.g., Marcella Bombardieri, Berklee Seeks to Build Dorm Tower and Theater, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2006, at Al (discussing the Harvard expansion into Allston); Steven Litt,
Ronayne's at Square One with Circle, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 27, 2005, at El (discussing the
Penn expansion and the acclaim that the university received for that expansion).
22. The students protested both the gym and the University's complicity in army research
for the War on Vietnam. They were eventually removed when the university administration called
in the New York City police. See Eviatar, supra note 18. Media around the world featured photos
of students beaten and bloodied in the process. Students and their faculty supporters responded
with a strike that shut down the university for the rest of the semester, and a new president was
soon selected to run the university. See generally JERRY L. AVORN, UP AGAINST THE IVY WALL:
A HISTORY OF THE COLUMBIA CRISIS (Robert Friedman ed., 1968) (providing a detailed account

of the 1968 uprising and the resulting violence based on the first-hand experiences of students,
faculty, administrators, local government representatives and members of the Harlem community).
See also Eviatar, supra note 18 ("[T]he standoff ended in bloodshed: police stormed the buildings,
beating and arresting students. Nearly 200 were injured."); John Giuffo, Big Plan on Campus,
THE VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Aug. 6, 2003, at 62 (describing the violence of the police reaction
and the paralysis of the university at the time).
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The area of West Harlem targeted for expansion was only beginning to
recover from a steep economic decline. Once a thriving port and business
district with small factories, such as Studebaker Auto, dairies and other light
industry and shops, it had fallen victim in the mid-twentieth century to the
country's first wave of de-industrialization, as capital moved first to the
suburbs and Southern states and then offshore to the global South in pursuit of
cheaper land and labor. The area is currently under-developed, consisting for
the most part of auto body shops, self-storage warehouses, meat-cutters, gas
stations, fast-food outlets, social-service offices, a bus-maintenance garage,
various odds and ends, and a valued supermarket that would not have to be
displaced.23 Columbia's planners were able to outline a site which would offer
adequate expansion while directly displacing at most one hundred
forty
24
households and a number of small businesses and service agencies.
Columbia had accumulated the capital to fund this expansion without
government financing. 25 It assembled a high-powered team to plan the new
campus. The University hired a world-class architect, Renzo Piano, who
developed an open, modem glass design concept, and paired him with the top
firm of Skidmore Owings and Merrill as architect of record, responsible for
construction drawings and administration. 26 The University retained top law
firms and had well-staffed in-house engineering and facilities departments and
the funds to outsource any work that proved beyond the capacity of these
departments. To manage relations with Harlem, City officials, and community
groups, Columbia appointed as Executive Vice President for Government and
Community Affairs Maxine Griffiths, an African American woman with deep
roots in Harlem who had served on the City Planning Commission under the
City's only Black mayor and who
had more recently taught urban planning at
27
the University of Pennsylvania.
23. See Timothy Williams, Land Dispute Pits Columbia vs. Residents in West Harlem,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 2006, at B I (noting that the area has been dominated by industrial uses since
the Industrial Revolution).
24. One hundred forty apartments is the figure used by expansion opponents. See
www.StopColumbia.org. (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). Columbia claims it will directly eliminate
only one hundred thirty two residential units. See COLUMBIA DRAFT EIS at 37. The small
businesses were estimated to have about 1200 employees. See, e.g., Bob Roberts, Open
University, CITY LIMITS, Dec. 2004, at 15, 16 available at www.citylimits.org/contentl
articles/viewarticle.cfln?articleid=3218 (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
25. Except that in New York, charitable nonprofit corporations pay neither real property
tax nor the "payments in lieu of taxes" required by many jurisdictions. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§§ 420-a to 420-b (McKinney 2003).
26. See Danielle Wolffe, Planning Ahead for Columbia Expansion, REAL EST. WKLY.,
Nov. 22, 2006, at 23 (describing those involved in the project); Renzo Piano Building Workshop
and Skidmore, Ownings, & Merrill, Columbia University Expansion, ARCHITECTURE MAG., Sept.
12, 2004, at 46 (describing the architectural plan for the campus). The law firm of Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel represented Columbia in its environmental review process and its eminent
domain application. See Kramer Levin, Environmental, http://www.kramerlevin.com/
environmental(last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
27. Griffith had served as the executive director of the Philadelphia City Planning Com
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B. The Community Group

Public officials and the media hailed Columbia's vision of an ultramodem world-class university research center rising in place of the area's
aging warehouses and car shops as a major advance. 28 In Harlem, however, and
in the uptown Dominican community that surrounds Columbia's medical center
and has spread south toward the expansion site, residents met the news with a

mixed response. Some local elected officials voiced cautious support, and some
established social agencies accepted Columbia's plans along with its generous

financial assistance. Other activists urged all out mobilization to stop
Columbia. 29 Still others advocated collective bargaining with the University to
gain a binding contract that guarantees substantial benefits for local residents in
exchange for their support of (or at least acquiescence in) an expansion that-in
the view of those activists-they could not stop but only marginally reshape.
WE ACT entered into the center of this controversy as a leading

proponent of the bargaining approach. Emerging in the early 1990s from
struggles against the siting of one of the City's largest sewage treatment plants

in this neighborhood, WE ACT had established its reputation by building
community power to improve environmental protection, health policy, and
quality of life in African American and Latino/a communities. Its main focus
for many years had been the location of environmental hazards, especially the
concentration in Northern Manhattan of asthma- and cancer-inducing diesel bus
depots. 30 It also led successful efforts to have New York State's Department of

Conservation adopt an agency-wide environmental justice policy. 3 1 In the
mission and secretary for strategic planning in that agency. Maxine Griffith Named Vice President
for Government and Community Affairs, COLUM. NEWS, July 13, 2005, available at
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/05/07/maxineGriffith.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). Before
that, she served at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development during the Clinton
administration, initially as the regional representative for New York and New Jersey and later as
HUD's assistant Deputy Secretary. Id. She also taught city planning and urban design at the
University of Pennsylvania, Columbia, and New York University. Id. Griffith outsourced
community outreach to a consulting firm headed by Bill Lynch, Deputy Mayor and chief of staff
for the same Black former mayor. The ex-mayor himself, David Dinkins, taught at Columbia and
authored a New York Times op-ed in support of the University's proposed expansion. David N.
Dinkins, Don't Fear Columbia, N.Y. Times, May 27, 2007, §A, Editorial Page, available at
http://select.nytimes.com/searchlrestricted/article?res--F40D 17FF3C540C748EDDAC0894DF404
482# (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
28. See, e.g., Lois Weiss, Reach for the Skies-Harlem's New Development is at Fever
Pitch, N.Y. POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at 50 (discussing the positive impact of Columbia's purchase of
land in Manhattanville on the "otherwise dingy area"); see also Columbia's Move on West
Harlem, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 14, at 11.

29. Coalition to Preserve Community, http://www.stopcolumbia.org (last visited Oct. 3,
2007) [hereinafter StopColumbia].
30. See Michael Specter, Harlem Groups File Suit to Fight Sewage Odors, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1992, at B3; WE ACT, WE ACT History, http://www.WEACT.org/history.html
[hereinafter WE ACT History] (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
31. See Erin M. Crotty, Comm'r, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Commissioner Policy
29:
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process, WE ACT had grown to a full-time paid staff of fourteen and developed
a sophisticated "inside-outside" strategy involving work with elected officials,
foundations, and Columbia University public health researchers as well as
community residents and activists. Gaining national and even global
prominence, WE ACT began to expand its vision of environmental justice to
encompass sustainable and equitable development. When the only remaining
accessible section of Harlem's Hudson River waterfront was slated in the late
1990s for development into high-end condos and hotels, WE ACT initiated a
"community visioning" process and political campaign that saved the area for
community recreational and educational use. 32 It continued to lead community
efforts to monitor and facilitate public development of the waterfront park,
including piers into the Hudson and closing of an adjacent street.
WE ACT's work around the waterfront park marked its first major foray
beyond traditional public health environmental issues. On the one hand,
conserving and expanding open space and public access to "nature" had long
been within the ambit of environmental activism. And the community's vision
of the park included an environmental education center that addressed the
ecology of both the Hudson River and the inner city. 3 3 Still, the waterfront
project marked a significant departure, positioning WE ACT for the first time
as a central player in helping the community to shape affirmatively how its land
should and should not be used, how public funds should be spent and how
public accountability to the community should be structured. WE ACT's
involvement in the community struggle over Columbia's expansion offered an
opportunity to continue this work within the context of a project that involved
much higher stakes and a host of issues not traditionally a part of the
organization's activism and leadership.
C. The Issues
The University's plans raised a number of core environmental issues
around which it had long been WE ACT's responsibility to lead community
education and advocacy. For example, thirty years of construction would spew
a huge volume of dust and particulate matter into neighborhoods whose

http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/36951.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); see also WE ACT
History, supra note 30 (discussing the successful effort to draft New York City's Local Law 1 of
2004, a lead poisoning prevention bill).
32. See West Harlem: Master Plan Toward a New Waterfront-125t St. to 137' * St.,
Broadway to the River, W. HARLEM PLAN UPDATE (N.Y. City Econ. Dev. Corp.), Summer 2002,
http://neighbors.columbia.edu/pages/manplanninglpdf-files/HarlemPiers.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,
2007); WE ACT, Harlem on the River Planning Document, Nov. 8, 2000,
http://www.WEACT.org/hotr/downloads/HOTRPlanningDocument.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007)
[hereinafter WE ACT, Harlem on the River]; WE ACT History, supra note 30.

33. WE ACT had been designated to develop and operate this center in a partnership with
Columbia, which had to be deferred until the University expansion issues could be resolved. See
WE ACT, Harlem on the River, supra note 32.
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residents already suffered extraordinary concentrations of asthma and other
respiratory ailments. 34 The gas stations, block-long diesel bus maintenance
garage, car shops, and similar ground-polluting uses scattered throughout the
expansion footprint would require thorough remediation (which might, in turn,
exacerbate air pollution). 35 The University planned to build a major bioresearch facility to experiment with "Level 3" substances, including contagious
airborne viruses, such as SARS (as well as HIV/AIDS, which is not contagious
and has killed thousands of Harlem residents), and many in the community
distrusted its promise to eschew work with dreaded "Level 4" substances, such
as Ebola and anthrax.36
34. See Columbia Draft EIS, supra note 18 at Ch. 22 at 13 available at
http:/nyc.gov/htmlldcp/pdf/env-review/manhattanville/22.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); Letter
from Coalition to Preserve Community Steering Committee to New York Department of City
Planning (Jan. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Coalition Response] (on file with author) available at
http://www.stopcolumbia.org/content/view/34/64/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); West Harlem
Environmental Action (WE ACT) for Environmental Justice, Official Written Comments on
Columbia's Proposed Manhattanville in West Harlem Zoning and Academic Mixed-Use
Development Environmental Impact Statement Draft Scope of Work (Jan. 6, 2006),
http://www.WEACT.org/columbiaIOfficialWrittenComments-O6JANO6.pdf, at 65 (last visited
Oct. 3, 2007) [hereinafter WE ACT, Official Written Comments], (stating that the expansion "will
deter pedestrian use of the area because of the noise, odors, and dust that will be ever-present");
see also id. at 67-68 (discussing the air quality problems that construction will cause and citing
studies about existing asthma rates in this part of the city and potential asthma-causing emissions
that construction would entail).
35. See Columbia Draft EIS, supra note 18 at Ch. 22 at 9-11 available at
http://nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdflenv-review/manhattanville/22.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007);Coalition
Response, supra note 34; WE ACT, Official Written Comments, supra note 24 at 47-49.
36. See Columbia Draft EIS, supra note 18 at Ch. 22 at 23-32 available at
http://nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/env-review/manhattanville/22.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); Eviatar,
supra note 18 (discussing the fact that Columbia has obtained security clearance to experiment
with highly dangerous substances, though the university claims that it has no intention of using
those substances in on-campus research); Murphy, supra note 19 (discussing the types of viruses
that may be involved in the Columbia labs that would be placed in West Harlem). The National
Institutes of Health set these biosafety levels (BSLs) in order to both promote necessary medical
research and to ensure that those laboratories conducting such research have adequate safety and
security requirements. See The Need for Biosafety Laboratory Facilities, NAT'L INSTS. OF
HEALTH, May 2006, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/facilityconstruct_O6.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2007). BSL-I agents are "not generally associated with disease in healthy people" and
require only minimal security measures. Id. BSL-2 agents are "associated with human disease"
and require that lab access be limited, that biohazard warning signs be placed, and that other
precautions be taken with work space, waste disposal, lab protection, physical containment
devices, etc. Id. BSL-3 agents are "associated with human disease and cause illness by spreading
through the air," additionally, they "[c]ause diseases that may have serious or lethal
consequences." Id. They require controlled access, decontamination of waste and clothing,
physical containment devices, protective clothing, respiratory protection, and certain technological
features like air circulators. See id. BSL-4 agents "[a]re associated with human disease and cause
illness by spreading through the air.., or have an unknown cause of transmission;" they also
"[c]ause diseases that are usually life-threatening." Id. Laboratories that do research with these
substances must have even more stringent safety procedures, like decontamination of all material,
changing of clothing and showering upon leaving the laboratory, and technological safety
measures like protective personnel suits and vacuum and decontamination systems. See id. in
addition to the construction of the labs, Columbia planned to dig a seven-story underground
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At a minimum, WE ACT would need to lead a community struggle over
these issues. Insofar as environmental and public health risks depended on
Columbia's future decisions, WE ACT would fight for ongoing monitoring and
full disclosure, with genuine opportunity for a community voice (if not a vote
or veto). WE ACT also would need to address the obstacles that the proposed
expansion posed to community access to the Hudson River waterfront park,
which WE ACT and community residents had fought so hard to obtain, and to
the community's main food market, located near the Waterfront Park.
Columbia's new campus would stand between the waterfront park and market
to its west, and the housing projects and other residential communities to its
east. Without providing for easy, inviting access through the campus by foot,
bicycle or bus, and friendly campus security guards, Columbia might
effectively shut out local residents, leaving their park and market largely for the
use of its students and staff.
The potential harms from Columbia's expansion extended far beyond
these traditional environmental and open space issues. Loss of affordable
housing was a major concern. The expansion would demolish five apartment
buildings that initially housed some one hundred thirty-two to one hundred
forty low income households. 37 While two of those buildings had been emptied
temporarily for renovation38 , the other three were fully occupied. One had
completed publicly-funded renovation and now housed formerly homeless
families who received supportive services on site. 39 Two others had been
designated for publicly-funded renovation and transfer to resident co-operative
ownership through the City's Tenant Interim Lease (TIL) program.40 As of July
2007, however, the University was reportedly in private negotiation with the
buildings' public and nonprofit owners to purchase all of the sites and relocate
the residents. 41 Though it promised to find the tenants "comparable" housing
nearby, these tenants were excluded from the negotiations and skeptical of the

factory - for deliveries, parking, heating and cooling, waste processing, storage, pool and gym dangerously close to an earthquake fault line. See Eviatar, supra note 18. Some of Columbia's
planned buildings would be as high as twenty stories, blocking light and waterfront views from
public housing projects to the East. See id. Heating, air conditioning, waste disposal and other
engineering features could exacerbate pollution, greenhouse gas emissions and other
environmental harms, or could minimize them through "green" design and construction. See WE
ACT, Official Written Comments, supra note 24, at 60-61.
37. See sources at note 24, supra; Erin Durkin, Relocation Discussions: Residents Allege
HPD Secrecy, Privacy Violations, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR, Mar. 2, 2006 [hereinafter Durkin,
Relocation Discussions];StopColumbia, supra note 29.
38. Interview with Donald Notice, Executive Director, West Harlem Group Assistance, a
community-based nonprofit organization which owns the buildings, New York, New York, April
10, 2007.
39. See http://www.hcci.org/RED/new.shtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2007), website of Harlem
Congregations for Community Involvement, the community-based nonprofit organization which
owns and operates the housing in a joint venture with Neighborhood Artists.
40. See note 128 infra and accompanying text.
41. See Durkin, Relocation Discussions, supra note 37; StopColumbia, supra note 29.
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outcome. 42
Beyond that, with much of Central Harlem already gentrifying, housing
demand from Columbia students and staff, other middle-upper income people,
and bio-tech businesses attracted by access to the University threatened
substantial "secondary displacement" by driving nearby rents well beyond the
means of the working poor Dominican and African American households living
near the proposed expansion site.43 Those who managed to stay, including
several thousand public housing tenants east of the site, would face a new
world in which high-end boutiques and rich, mainly white students would
replace their neighbors, shops, and churches.
Only months after Columbia announced its plans, Riverside Park
Community, an eleven hundred ninety-unit publicly-subsidized low and
moderate-income apartment complex across the street from the expansion site,
opted out of the subsidy program." The affordable use restriction period
attached to its construction subsidies had expired 45 and the for-profit corporate
42. Id.
43. See Robin Pogrebin, A Man About Town, In Glass and Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005,
at El; David Usborne, Welcome to Harlem, NYC, Ten Years Ago It Was the No-Hope GhettoNow Everybody Wants a Piece of It, THE INDEP. (London), Feb. 13, 2000, at I. See also Julian
Brash, Gentrification in Harlem? A Second Look (May 4, 2000) (unpublished M.S. thesis,

Columbia University), available at http://eastharlempreservation.org/docs/brash.pdf (last visited
Oct. 3, 2007) (discussing existing gentrification in Harlem and changing opinions about it over
time). Secondary displacement involves housing that is lost as an indirect result of nearby
development, most often through rising rent prices. WE ACT, Official Written Comments, supra
note 24, at 82 ("An even more insidious effect of the expansion project is that it will spur a rash of
land speculation and cause rent and housing prices in the area to skyrocket. This will result in a
second and much more widespread wave of secondary displacement as current residents will be
pushed more to the margins of the City because they can no longer afford their present home").
44. Tanveer Ali, Harlem Building Ends Low Rent Program, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR,
Apr. 28, 2004. Though the owner denied that Columbia's expansion motivated its decision to opt
out, the tenants and local housing activists, as well as WE ACT and its legal team, thought the
timing speaks for itself. See Deborah Brown, City Housing: Rising Rents, Federal Cuts, Local
Innovation, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR, May 9, 2005.
45. Tanveer Ali, 3333 Residents Still Wait Impatientlyfor PromisedRent Relief, COLUM.
DAILY SPECTATOR, Sept. 8, 2005; see also N.Y. PRiv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2002).
The Mitchell-Lama Housing Program is a New York State program created in 1955 with the goal
of building affordable housing for middle-income people. See Mitchell-Lama Housing Program,
N.Y. Dlv. OF Hous. & CMTY. RENEWAL, http://www.dhcr.state.ny.us/ohm/progs/
mitchlam/ohmprgmi.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Michell-Lama Program];see also
NY PRiv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 11. There have been 269 Mitchell-Lama developments (over 105,000
housing units) built since the inception of the program, but a number of them have withdrawn
from the program under a buyout program that permits owners to withdraw after twenty years on
prepayment of the mortgage (note that it may be thirty-five years in cases of some older
developments). See Michell-Lama Program, supra. These housing developments are owned by
private developers but supervised by city or state agencies. See Judith A. Calogero, Comm'r, N.Y.
Dlv. OF Hous. & CMTY. RENEWAL, Mitchell-Lama Buyout Program, Aug. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/ audits/allaudits/093005/04s5.pdf, at I (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). To
encourage private parties to participate in the program, the state financed low-interest, long term
mortgages that defrayed a number of the total development costs, and local governments granted
property tax exemptions to encourage developers to participate. Id. Until the owners buy out, they
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owner calculated that with Columbia's arrival, market rents would yield greater
profit than ongoing operating subsidies.46 Once the complex opted out, its
tenants were no longer protected by New York State rent regulation47 . Some
were able to hang on through federal subsidies that cover the gap between
market rent and thirty percent of household income for tenants whose buildings
were constructed with federal subsides. 48 But this politically contested rent
voucher program is funded only year by year, and many tenants were ruled
ineligible. 49 Others were lured or forced out in favor of young professionals
able to pay high, unregulated rents. Following well-established patterns of

gentrification, building maintenance, amenities, and access to common spaces
were manipulated to privilege the new tenants and punish the old. 50 The
must maintain affordable rent; if they buy out, they may raise rents as high as they would like. See
id. at 1-2. The decline in affordable housing is related to the decline of available Mitchell-Lama
housing in the city. See William C. Thompson, Jr., Comptroller, City of N.Y., Affordable Housing
Crisis
is
Accelerating,
May
25,
2006,
available
at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/enews/jun06.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (discussing the
decline in available Mitchell-Lama housing and making recommendations for the future of the
project). The Mitchell-Lama program has been in the news quite a bit lately, especially because
one well-known Mitchell-Lama development, known as Starrett City, was almost sold. See, e.g.,
Alexandra Marks, With 'Affordable Housing' Buildingsfor Sale, Tenants Worry, THE CHRISTIAN
SC. MONITOR (Boston, Mass.), Mar. 5, 2007, at 1; see also C.J. Hughes, Exit the Lawyers, Cue
the Builders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, § 11, at 8 (discussing the approval of a renewal project
that took over a Mitchell-Lama housing development); Janny Scott, In Governor's Race, Group
Pushes to Make Lower-PricedHousing a State Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at B5 (discussing
the New York City mayoral race and the discussions about affordable housing in that race,
including Mitchell-Lama housing).
46. This dynamic was typical of the privately owned, publicly assisted affordable housing
projects developed in the 1970s (in contrast to public housing built in the 1930s and 1940s, which
remains publicly owned and operated). On the New York City implications, see Victor Bach, The
Future of HUD-Subsidized Housing: The New York City Case, in HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY: FACING THE FUTURE 143 (Michael H. Shill ed., 1999); see
also What Might Happen to Section 8 PropertiesUnder the New Law?, Hous. BULL. (Nat'l Hous.
L. Project, Oak., Cal.), 28 Hous. L. BULL.
17 (Feb.
1998), available at
http://www.nhlp.orglhtml/hlb/298/298section8.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
47. Rent stabilization governs only buildings fully occupied on or before January 1, 1974,
but Riverside opened in 1976 and reached full occupancy in 1978. See In re KSLM-Columbus
Apts, Inc. v. N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 835 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 2005).
48. United States Housing Act § 8(t) of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) (2006). Federal Section
8 Enhanced Vouchers are available for tenants in buildings which, like this one, received federal
construction subsidies under section 236 of the National Housing Act of 1968, and have opted or
bought out of subsidy-linked rent restrictions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (2006).
49. Tenants can be denied enhanced vouchers for earning too much, living in too large or
small a unit, having a household member who was convicted of a violent crime, or failing to
timely produce required paperwork. See § 1437f(t), supra note 48; Housing Preservation:
Enhanced Vouchers, NAT'L HoUs. L. PROJECT, available at http://www.nhlp.org/html/
pres/vouchers/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); Public and Indian Housing. Housing Choice
Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S.
DEP'T OF HoUs.
& URBAN
DEV., available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hcv/about/fact__sheet.cfm#9 (last visited Oct. 3, 2007);
Residential Tenants: Section 8 Information, CITY OF N.Y. DEP'T OF Hous. PRESERVATION &
DEV., available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/tenants/section_8.shtml#StickyVouchers
(last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (describing enhanced, or "sticky" vouchers).
50. This discussion is based on reports by project tenants and tenant leaders.
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prospect of market profits from Columbia's announced expansion rapidly
shattered the community and social capital built over thirty years of shared life.
Jobs and local small businesses were also at issue. A number of
businesses and social agencies would be displaced. The University estimated
that twelve hundred workers would be affected, 51 but argued that many would
remain employed at new locations and that the expansion would create far more
jobs than it eliminated. Community activists, however, questioned how many
and what types of new jobs would really be available to local residents.
Many of these issues had been addressed elsewhere through Community
Benefits Agreements (CBAs). 2 Pioneered in Los Angeles at the start of this
century, CBAs stand outside the normal government process as private, legally
binding contracts between community groups and developers.5 3 City officials
often play important background roles in the bargaining process, and the City is
sometimes made an additional party to strengthen capacity to monitor and
enforce compliance. 4 A CBA could pin down Columbia's promises and
commit it to specific measures to mitigate secondary displacement and other
harms from its expansion. Beyond that, a CBA could require the University to
provide substantial funds, resources and staff for better schools, health centers,
and other urgently needed community services and facilities. These could be
viewed as compensation (or even reparation) for the University's annexation of
an area that might otherwise have been developed to the greater benefit of the
surrounding communities, especially since the area's prospects were beginning
to pick up with the coming of the food market, two new restaurants and the
waterfront park along with the economic development of nearby Central
Harlem.
D. The Strategy

WE ACT understood the potential and limits of a CBA. On the one hand,
the opportunity for a community coalition to contract directly with developers
represents an important advance. Without a CBA, developers can make city

51.
52.

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C; see also Julian Gross, et al. Community Benefits Agreements:

Making Development ProjectsAccountable, GooD JOBS FIRST & THE CAL. P'SHIP FOR WORKING
FAMS. (2005), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/cba2005final.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,
2007). It has become "standard practice" in cities around the country "for developers of major
projects to negotiate with neighborhood and other groups" to negotiate these CBAs. See Terry
Pristin, Square Feet: In Major Projects,Agreeing Not to Disagree,N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at
C6. These agreements are contracts that "almost always contain wage and hiring goals and may
also include a grab bag of concessions, like a day care center, a new park, free tickets to sports
events and cash outlays to be administered by the groups themselves." Id.
53. See, e.g., Nona Liegeois & Malcolm Carson, Accountable Development: Maximizing
Community Benefitsfrom Publicly Supported Development, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 174, 176 (JulyAug. 2003), availableat http://www.lafla.org/pdf/accountDevel.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
54. Id.; Gross, supra note 52.
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55
governments empty promises which local residents have no way to enforce.

The CBA process encourages low-income and working class people to develop

their own vision for their communities, moving beyond mainstream CED's
dependence on outside capital, which determines what types of facilities can be
built and what services provided in low-income communities.5 6 CBA
negotiations offer communities a constructive alternative to fighting to block a
proposed project. Those fights rarely succeed, and even when they do, the

community is only left back where it started, without the capital needed to
implement its vision. On the other hand, a community can reap substantial
gains only if it forms a broad-based negotiating coalition that has sufficient
political clout to win real benefits and sufficient organizational capacity to
enforce and use those benefits. 57 Without these, a CBA serves only to co-opt
protest and legitimate
detrimental development without real benefit to
58
residents.
community
WE ACT's goal was to empower the residents of the neighborhoods
surrounding the expansion site, especially the racially-excluded and politicallymarginalized, to gain some significant control over the use of local land and
resources. However, WE ACT did not aspire to become a developer. Local
nonprofit housing and economic development corporations could already do
that effectively, and WE ACT well understood the pitfalls of going down that
road.5 9 Like the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) in Boston and
as in its own waterfront project, WE ACT would work to enable a process of
democratic broad-based grassroots community planning and organizing
to
60
envision and win the best possible benefits agreement from Columbia.

55.
56.

See Gross, supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See Cummings, Toward a GrassrootsMovement, supra note 2; Gross, supra note 52, at

3.
57. See Gross, supra note 52, at 22-23; Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3,
at 317 (discussing the importance of the unions coming together to present a united front in the
Staples Center negotiations).
58. See infra note 165 (discussing the Bronx Terminal Market and Yankee Stadium
projects).
59. Community groups that become developers have difficulty maintaining their activism
since they come to depend on government and corporate financing, need to hire professional and
technical staff rather than organizers and advocates, and often become alienated from local
residents due to their roles as landlords, large-scale employers and creditors. They become players
in, no longer oppose, and inadvertently lend legitimacy to, a political economy that subordinates
and exploits community residents. See Randy Stoecker, The CDC Model of Urban
Redevelopment: A Political Critique and an Alternative, 19 J. OF URBAN AFF. 1 (1997)
(advocating separation of community organizing and planning from nonprofit housing and
economic development); see also Cummings, Toward a Grassroots Movement, supra note 2, at
453-54; Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social
Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217 (1999).
60. On DSNI, see PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND
RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 254-87 (1994); Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment
Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689
(1994).
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Accordingly, WE ACT aspired to catalyze a multi-faceted struggle that
would enable residents to develop a vision for their community and extract
funding and services from the University and local government to realize that
vision. This effort would tax WE ACT's limited resources and involve it in
substantive terrain (housing, jobs, and schools) new to the organization as a
whole, though not new to all of its staff. Taking a leading role in community
responses to Columbia's expansion appeared to be such a natural extension of
WE ACT's history and perspective, and such a necessity for its community,
that no member of its staff or board of directors at any point suggested that it do
otherwise. Nonetheless, this move, however organic and seemingly inevitable,
would challenge WE ACT's existing skill set and continue its transformation. It
would accelerate the evolution of its roles in the community and its legal
team's roles in its work, and it would thrust WE ACT fully into the vortex of
Harlem development policy and politics.
II
COMMUNITY ACTIVISM INCONTEXT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN
DEVELOPMENT
WE ACT's ascendancy as a key player in Harlem development has
required that it appreciate both the particular issues raised by the Columbia
development and the larger dynamics underlying development "deals" in
revitalizing cities. As WE ACT understood from its earlier successes with the
Waterfront development, no major urban development project is likely to
succeed today without a winning political coalition. As has long been true of
city politics, various local stakeholders compete and sometimes cooperate with
city officials to influence development decisions in a sort of unbalanced
pluralist dance. 61 Thus, the alignment of particular constellations of public and
private interests is essential to the success of almost any major urban
development project.
Yet political power to influence development in central cities has become
even more decentralized and diffuse as cities depend increasingly on securing
external, private capital in competition with other local governments. This
decentralization of political power and capital in urban development has
significantly shifted the role of public (governmental) and private
(nongovernmental) players in development deals. The city or local government,
though still retaining its regulatory authority over land use, nevertheless has
become a weaker player in a more crowded field of powerbrokers. Private
developers, as well as the interests/stakeholders that they advance and
challenge (or threaten), now have significantly expanded roles and influence in

61. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY (1961) (describing the study of New Haven mid-century as a democratic success

story).
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determining the success or failure of major development projects. In large part,
this shift is due to the advent of "neoliberalism," which ushered in cutbacks of
federal funds, reduced regulation, and catalyzed private and market-based
solutions to urban redevelopment, among other things. 62 This changed political
economy is important not just to understanding the role that WE ACT was
positioning itself to assume vis-A-vis the Columbia expansion, but also to
understanding the multidimensionality of roles assumed by its lawyers, a theme
to which we will turn shortly.
A. The Decentralizationof PoliticalInfluence and Capital in Urban
Development
At least since the 1970s urban development has become increasingly more
decentralized-physically, economically, and politically-and specialized in its
upward class transformation and economic conversion of cities.6 3 From
roughly the 1930s to the 1970s, centralized, top-down management of
redevelopment (government) funds characterized much of urban development
in central cities. Fueled by the Works Progress Administration (WPA),
highway program and "urban renewal" policies, federal funds often flowed
directly through local planning and development agencies into local
construction projects. Political influence was often centralized and concentrated
in one or a few local public "powerbrokers," like the infamous Robert Moses,
who wielded enormous power on behalf of business and political interests to
shape the development of inner cities and competing suburbs using federal
funds allocated pursuant to urban renewal and related programs. 64 The "federal
aorta" of money that ran from Washington, D.C. into local redevelopment
agencies financed local development, especially urban renewal, and enabled
money to be spent in largely unaccountable ways. 65 The centralization of
62.

See generally

SPACES

OF NEOLIBERALISM:

URBAN

RESTRUCTURING

IN NORTH

AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002) (examining the role
of neoliberal political projects since the 1970s in shaping the dynamics of urban change in North

America and Europe, including the reproduction and intensification of uneven spatial
development within and between cities).
63. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation,
Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 15-17

(2006).
64. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL
OF NEW YORK (1974) (describing the rise and concentration of power to redevelop New York in
the hands of Robert Moses); RAE, supra note 1, at 316 (describing the work of Ed Logue, who ran
New Haven's Redevelopment Agency during the Urban Renewal era and later headed New York
State's Urban Development Corporation and Boston's redevelopment agency as "second only to
Robert Moses' as a practitioner of urban transformation"); see also JOEL SCHWARTZ, THE NEW
YORK APPROACH: ROBERT MOSES, URBAN LIBERALS AND REDEVELOPMENT OF THE INNER CITY

(1993).
65. For example, as Douglas W. Rae writes, in the context of New Haven urban renewal:
The IRS collected cash from taxpayers across America, Congress placed it at the
disposal of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), and later the Urban
Renewal Administration, and the Redevelopment Agency of New Haven competed
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power and resources in the hands of a largely unelected group of public
officials led to the bulldozing of large parts of central cities to build public
works, commercial/office
centers, hotels, high-end housing,
elite
cultural/performing arts centers (e.g., Lincoln Center), and highways, many of
which displaced working class communities and lower income families.
Urban renewal and its concentration of power in government
bureaucracies run by local powerbrokers was enabled by the existence of broad
local "progrowth" coalitions that operated to control (and isolate) political
opposition to land clearance projects.66 These powerbrokers also operated
within city governments that, perhaps ironically, could be characterized as
democratically pluralistic in their susceptibility to influence by different groups
of local residents. Robert A. Dahl argued in his influential study of New Haven
during the mid-twentieth-century that political power and control in city
government was widely dispersed among different interest/ethnic groups who
competed to wield influence over city decisions. 67 As with any pluralist
system, however, those possessing the fewest resources to compete and
influence decision makers tended to be the biggest losers. This was particularly
true in the case of urban renewal projects, which indelibly fractured the urban
68
landscape by race and class.
Urban development politics and economics have become even more
decentralized and diffuse since the 1970s in no small part due to "the
with remarkable success for the resulting swag. The money came to that "local agency"
under federal law, and not to the general fund of city government, which is to say it
came to [Ed Logue, head of the city's Redevelopment Agency] and his Redevelopment
colleagues. Their projects and plans required approval from the Board of Aldermen,
and some cooperation from any number of city agencies, but the Redevelopment
budgets were virtually autonomous from city politics. The Kremlin [redevelopment]
was financed largely by people who were not entitled to vote in New Haven, mostly on
a funding formula which granted two-thirds of net project costs in federal dollars and
then allowed the local agency to count many in-kind items toward the local third.
RAE, supra note 1, at 322.

66.

PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT

CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

147-48 (1995); SCHWARTZ, supra note 64.
67. DAHL, supra note 61, at 214. Shifting political constellations of different interests, he
argued, created an "executive-centered" coalition that governed the city during this era. Id. at 214
("The preferences of any group that could swing its weight at election time-teachers, citizens of
the Hill, Negroes on Dixwell Avenue, or Notables-would weigh heavily in the calculations of
the Mayor"). Dahl's views were contested at the time and remain contested. See, e.g., CHARLES
BLATTBERG, FROM PLURALIST TO PATRIOTIC POLITICS: PUTTING PRACTICE FIRST ch. 5 (2000); G.
William Domhoff, Who Really Ruled in Dahl's New Haven?, Sept. 2005, available at
http://sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/newhaven.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
68. A retrospective look at New Haven and other central cities reveals clear winners and
losers from the urban renewal era. Today, the New Haven metropolitan region, like many older
urban regions, is prominently characterized by race and class inequalities that tend to reinforce
one another. See RAE, supra note 1, at 420 (taking issue with Dahl's argument that
political/interest inequalities in New Haven have come to offset rather than reinforce and
concluding that "there are reasons to doubt or even reject his generalizations as the subject of
inquiry switches to the region as a whole," particularly when one considers the clear disparities
between New Haven and its surrounding, more affluent towns).
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY
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exhaustion of urban renewal as a form of urban entrepreneurship." 69 As Paul

Kantor has argued, this exhaustion is attributable to the weakening of local
political coalitions that supported urban renewal and to urban renewal's
economic obsolescence-i.e., the fact that it "largely fulfilled its mission of
setting into motion the process of economic conversion" of cities. 7° With the
loss of federal funding and other public sources of redevelopment money,
development in cities has now shifted away from large scale land clearing
projects to more piecemeal redevelopment, designed to complete the upward
economic conversion of cities. This effort requires cities and municipalities to
compete for "footloose" investors and industries, who now have enormous
power to control and shape redevelopment policies in cities. 71
B. The City as a Weak(er) Player

As cities grow increasingly dependent upon private capital and resources
and stymied by competition with other municipalities for those resources, their
leverage over developers has seriously declined, as has their ability to control
their social and economic destiny. 72 Private investors acquire tremendous
69. KANTOR, supra note 66, at 150.
70. Id. at 150-51 (noting that "[v]ast slum areas had been demolished, new commercial and
residential opportunities on vacant downtown land were in place, and the process of social
'upgrading' in residential neighborhoods adjacent to renewal sites had begun").
71.
As Paul Kantor has argued:
The economic dilemma facing most older central cities is no longer one of physical
restructuring of their cores. It is one of inducing continued conversion of their
economies at a time of shrinking tax bases, cuts in intergovernmental aid, and
increasing competition from urban jurisdictions in suburbia.... In general, this has
forced city governments to undertake more flexible, piecemeal strategies to induce
capital investment in particular markets and businesses. Economic development policy
mostly is one of selling the city by accommodating the demands of individual revenueprovider groups and businesses through varied public entrepreneurial techniques that
provide incentives for them to invest in the locale. The "packaging" of more or less
tailor-made business incentive programs is now the current development policy....
[T]hese packages can include tax abatements, loans, discounted land sales, new
industrial parks, housing rehabilitation grants, and other forms of business subsidies.
Kantor, supra note 66, at 151-52; see also H.V. Savitch & Paul Kantor, Cities in the
International Marketplace: The Political Economy of Urban Development in North America and
Western Europe (2002) (arguing that local governments compete for private capital in the
international marketplace and that they adopt policy strategies to influence the terms of their
participation; the more bargaining advantages held by a city, the greater its ability to shape urban
development).
72. See KANTOR, supra note 66, at 4-5 (arguing that "[allthough local political systems
have become more open to community wishes, dependency on exterior economic forces
increasingly has undermined [cities'] ability to act responsively on issues of economic and social
development" and citing as an example that "New York City officials found it easier to give away
millions to a wealthy corporation than to extend aid to the homeless"); see also Neil Smith, New
Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy, in SPACES OF
NEOLIBERALISM 8o, supra note 62, at 95-96 ("Whereas urban renewal of in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s sought a full-scale remaking of the centers of many cities and galvanized many sectors of
the urban economy in the process, it was highly regulated and economically and geographically
limited by the fact that it was wholly dependent on public financing and therefore had to address
issues of broad social necessity, such as social housing. In contrast, the earliest wave of
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bargaining advantages or "rents," including new sports stadiums, operating and
tax subsidies, shares in parking garages, and concessions, which diminish the
regulatory power, and ultimately the resources, of local governments. 73 In this
new political economic environment, the city is now a weaker player in a larger
system of power that drives urban development. 74 Consequently, much of the
onus of attending to communities' economic and social welfare has shifted to
communities themselves.
This decrease in city power has been happening at a time when, ironically,
the relationship between city government and the public has become, at least as
a formal matter, increasingly open, participatory, and institutionalized. Public
hearings, advisory committees, and devolution of land use planning discussion
and analysis to smaller units of the urban polis have characterized this era of
increased participation in local government. 75 Nevertheless, the limits of this
formal participatory governance are starkly obvious, particularly to those least
able to participate in local government decisions because they lack social and
economic influence. 76 Even though more formal avenues exist for public
gentrification that followed urban renewal proceeded with considerable independence from the
public sector.... What marks the latest phase of gentrification in many cities, therefore, is that a
new amalgam of corporate and state powers and practices has been forged in a much more
ambitious effort to gentrify the city than earlier ones").
73. New York City's elaborate and expensive effort to keep the Yankees in town, including
the over $200 million in state and city grants and huge tax exemptions, is only a recent example of
this phenomenon. See KANTOR, supra note 66, at 115-16 (citing the example of some cities'
efforts to keep its sports stadiums and concluding that, although nearly all of the stadiums built
since 1960 are publicly owned, the sports facilities that in fact are supposed to provide a source of
revenue for cities are instead a taxpayer burden imposing heavy costs on cities); see also
Raymond J. Keating, Op-Ed., Don't Throw Our Money Down the Drain; The PoliticiansSay
Stadiums Will Be Built with Private Funds, But the Public Will Still Get Soaked for Millions,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 17, 2005, at A51 (discussing the fact that taxpayers would cover over $200
million in infrastructure, and that an even higher amount would be given once the city took into
account the tax-exempt bonds and lack of property taxes).
74. See, e.g., KANTOR, supra note 66, at 5 (arguing that "[t]he capability of city
governments to democratically shape their economic and social development has seriously
declined" as result of cities' dependence on the market dynamics of private sector); RAE, supra
note 1,at xviii (noting the shift away from democratic pluralism to "the end of urbanism" as
entailing "the end of thinking about city government as a pivotal and more or less autonomous
power system").
75. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. In particular, community boards in New
York "represent the city's longest running effort to involve local communities directly in the
government. People debate how successful the system of community boards has been, but through
them, many neighborhoods have gained a voice in the decisions that affect them." Seth Forman,
Community Boards, GOTHAM GAZETTE N.Y. CITY NEWS & PO.'Y (Sept. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article//20000920/202/150 (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). At present,
there are fifty-nine community boards throughout the city, which consist of unsalaried members
who have some interest in the community. Id. Their responsibilities include: "I. Improving the
delivery of city services; 2. Planning and reviewing land use in the community; 3. Making
recommendations on the city's budget" and 4. Consulting on the "placement of most municipal
facilities in the community." Id.
76. See generally Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A
CollaborativeModel for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement, and Adaptive Planning in
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participation, land use decisions primarily respond to individual development
projects that often result from the local government striking a bargain with the
77
individual property owner or developer.
Thus, while public modes of discourse surrounding overall urban land use
and specific development projects have remained over time, a form of interest
bargaining that reflects the larger political economy of urban development now
supplements them. That is, development incentives have lined up such that
affected communities now view themselves as potential players in, as opposed
to passive recipients of, the "bargain" struck between developers and the city.
C. NegotiatingAccountability
The emergence and increasing prominence of CBAs is a potent reflection
of the changed political dynamic of urban development. As enforceable
agreements between community groups and developers, CBAs "represent a
fundamental break with the traditional posture of developers and public entities
toward low-income communities affected by major projects."7" Within a CBA
framework, both developers and communities face incentives to participate and
negotiate with one another: developers bargain directly with the community as
a way to win its backing for the project or, at least, neutralize its opposition,
and communities participate out of a desire to mitigate negative development
impacts and maximize development benefits. There is an arguably
redistributive aim to the community's willingness to bargain directly with the
developer. Projects that are in significant part subsidized by taxpayer funds are
now going to finance affordable housing, jobs, environmental, and
infrastructure amenities, and other "benefits," thus returning some of that
money to the public/community.
The power of the landmark Los Angeles CBAs stemmed primarily from
the strength of the forces that came together to bargain with developers. Those
coalitions united community groups with powerful, well-staffed, city-wide

Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. U. 3, (2005) (discussing the reigning "bilateral,
negotiated land use" model in which important local land use decisions are frequently made in

closed-door negotiations that exclude many affected parties, further disenfranchising those with
the least influence and fewest resources).
77. Id. at 14 (stating that "[z]oning regulations no longer serve as a fixed vision of the
community's plan, but rather as a baseline rights allocation from which a locality and a developer
bargain"); see also Juliana Maantay, Zoning Law, Health and EnvironmentalJustice: What's the
Connection?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 572, 582 (2002) (finding, based on the author's study of
changes to zoning classifications over a 27-year period in New York City, that "[c]ity planning's
role [is] basically seen as a support mechanism to facilitate private real estate initiatives for
projects that the city or state could no longer afford to undertake" and that "[g]overnment's desire

for private sector investment in the city seemed to override the need for conformance to the
mandated comprehensive planning process, the desire to guide planning, or the need to put the
community's desires on an at least equal footing with the private sector").
78. Liegeois & Carson, supra note 53, at 176.
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progressive organizations, 79 major unions, and strong national environmental
organizations. 8' Staff and leaders of these high-capacity
organizations led the
82
negotiations, in consultation with community activists.
As the CBA concept spread across the country, developers and politicians
sought to capture and adapt it for their own ends. In 2006, developers of two
major projects in the Bronx attempted to undercut community opposition by
means of CBAs that would, in a labor setting, rightly be deemed "sweetheart
contracts" with "company unions." While winning very little for the
communities, these agreements succeeded in providing cover for elected
officials to get the projects approved, likely after cutting their own deals with
the developers. For the Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market, local
political leaders first handpicked the CBA negotiating coalition, excluding
groups that might publicly criticize an inadequate CBA; when most of the
handpicked groups rejected the developer's paltry offer, the political leaders
went ahead with a CBA signed only by the President of a publicly funded
community college and two other groups controlled by the political leaders. 83
The developer of the Yankee Stadium project did not even bother with this
84
sham, instead simply announcing a unilateral "community benefits program."

79. See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3, at 315-17 (discussing the
involvement of economic justice organizations, like Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE)
and the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), as well as community organizing
groups, like Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Development Alternatives
(AGENDA)); see also Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Development
Alternatives, http://www.scopela.org/agenda/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); Los Angeles
Alliance for a New Economy, http://www.laane.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); Strategic Actions

for a Just Economy, http://www.saje.net/site/c.hkLQJcMUKrH/b.2315777/k.BF4B/

Home.htm

(last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
80. Especially UNITE HERE, which hoped to represent long-term employees. See UNITE
HERE, http://unitehere.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
81. Particularly Environmental Defense and the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), especially in the Los Angeles airport CBA, which focused significantly on

environmental benefits to mitigate the impacts of airport expansion. See Environmental Defense,
http://secure.environnentaldefense.org/documents/4205-Solutions_0105.pdf
(describing
the
organization's role in negotiating the Los Angeles airport CBA) (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); see
also National Resources Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/default.asp (last visited Oct. 3,

2007).
82. This paragraph is based on Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3.
83. See Robin Shulman & Diane Cardwell, Campaigningfor City Hall: The Campaign;
Weiner Attacks City's Deal on Bronx Market, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at B8. Much of this is
based on discussion with Gavin Kearney, who represented community groups that were pushed
out of the CBA negotiations, and on his "Analysis of Areas of Disagreement between Final CBA
and CBA Task Force Positions" regarding the Bronx Terminal Market project. Telephone
Interview with Gavin Kearney, StaffAttorney, New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, in N.Y.,
N.Y. (Feb. 12, 2007). Memorandum from Gavin Kearney, Staff Attorney, New York Lawyers for
the Public Interest (Feb. 2, 2006) (detailing the deficiencies of the Bronx Terminal Market CBA as
compared with other CBAs around the country, specifically in the areas of living wage
requirements, hiring and referral requirements and enforcement mechanisms) (on file with
authors).
84.

See Keating, supra note 73; Kearney, supra note 83.
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Central Brooklyn communities divided more evenly over the Atlantic
Yard project, which features a National Basketball Association (NBA) arena
along with high-rise apartment and office buildings. Young white professional
homeowners in or near the site fought hard to stop, or at least scale back, the
development to protect their homes and neighborhoods. Residents of outlying
Black working class neighborhoods, on the other hand, saw a major
opportunity. 85 They joined with ACORN (Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now), a well-staffed national organization also
involved in the Los Angeles CBAs,86 and several churches and community
boards to negotiate a CBA. The resulting CBA accepted eminent domain and
large-scale development in exchange for hundreds of units of affordable
housing (specifying rent levels to insure a mix, which included the very-low
income), decent paying jobs (with training and priority for area residents), and
small business aid and opportunities. The developer even agreed to open its
books and pay $100,000 a year for an independent monitor deemed acceptable
by the community groups.
These examples illustrate how the rise and utility of CBAs render the
"game" of urban development highly textured and dependent not only upon the
particular constellation of players in the place where development occurs but
also upon the particular development project being contested. The costs and
benefits of a project are often not fixed but depend upon the choices players
make-choices that are shaped throughout the process of negotiation between
the developer and the city, between the city and the interested public, among
stakeholders and interests within that public, and between the developer and the
interested public. How this game plays out is a crucial factor in determining the
opportunities and challenges presented to its participants, including lawyers
working on behalf of the various players.

LAWYERING IN CONTEXT:

III
WE ACT'S

INTERVENTION IN THE COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY EXPANSION

The struggle over Columbia's proposed expansion reflects these evolving
dynamics of the urban political economy. The initiating driving force was a
non-governmental actor, Columbia University, which is not very different in its
general role in the development process from any other private business or
developer.8 7 Columbia brought its own substantial capital and an armada of
85. See Michael O'Keefe, Jump Ball: Brooklyn Groups Still Up in Air Over Ratner
Proposal,N.Y. DAILY NEws, Nov. 27, 2005, at 63.
86. See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3, at 317 (discussing the role of
ACORN in the Staples Center CBA); see also ACORN.org: Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now, http://www.acom.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
87. See Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21'
Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 895 (2006) (questioning whether universities, CDCs, and BIDs
are more appropriate planners/developers than cities). Columbia's nonprofit status does, of course,
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experts, technicians, and public relations specialists. Though the University was
not seeking public subsidies or loans, it would need regulatory approval and
other important cooperation from city and state government. 88 At all levels,
however, government was in a secondary, reactive position: it could mandate
disclosure, set time lines, and ultimately vote the project up or down, but it had
only limited capacity to shape the project.
The impacted communities, their organizations, and their leaders were
fragmented across lines of race, nationality, class, geography, personal and
institutional interest, and political ideology. Different community interests and
groups sought to form coalitions to consolidate their power in order to
influence the ultimate deal between Columbia and the City, and between
themselves and Columbia. However, their combined resources and capacity
were miniscule in comparison to those of the University. An array of elected
officials and business and property owners also attempted to intervene in
sporadic efforts to advance their own diverse interests. It was on this terrain
that WE ACT struggled to forge a broad-based effort that would transform
crisis into opportunity, enabling community residents to win significant
benefits and emerge from the process with stronger organization and greater
resources and leverage.
It was also on this terrain that WE ACT sought to employ its significant
legal resources to intervene and leverage ongoing public regulatory and
deliberative processes to win gains for community interests. These processes
consisted largely of land use reviews but also encompassed "hard look"
reviews by local and state officials and agencies. s9 This "hard look" was
ostensibly designed to study, catalog, and deliberate on the positive and
negative impacts of development and change or mitigate those impacts as
necessary. Thus, WE ACT's legal team could theoretically play an important
role in bringing these impacts tothe attention of local and state decision-makers
and in helping to persuade those decision-makers to act in the best interests of
the community, an admittedly difficult task given the community's fragmented
response to this particular development. In other words, the legal team might
have been able to enforce the community's participation rights in whatever
public processes were required for approving the developer's project or to
legally intervene by threatening lawsuits (or other forms of legal disruption)

have some effects. See infra Part IV.B. 1 (describing Columbia as initially impervious to delay in
development projects).
88. The University's properties are exempt from municipal real estate tax under general
legislation that applies to all nonprofit organizations in New York. Unlike many other
jurisdictions, New York does not require nonprofit owners to make Payments in Lieu of Taxes
(known as "PILOTs"). See supra text accompanying note 25.
89. See, e.g., Matter of Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 417
(stating that in SEQRA and CEQR proceedings, the court "may review the record to determine if
the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a 'hard look' at them, and
made a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis for its determination").
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that would compromise the deal between the developer and the government and
ultimately force the developer to the negotiating table. 90 Such legal
"leveraging," in contrast to the institution-building approach of traditional CED
lawyers, would give the community negotiating power that it otherwise would
lack. 9'
This legal "leveraging," however, proved quite tenuous and limited in this
context. Notwithstanding the legal levers in the city and state decision-making
processes, ultimately there was little that "traditional" lawyering, even
community lawyering as we understand it in the literature, could accomplish to
change the trajectory of this development deal. Rather, the larger politicaleconomic dynamic swirling around the deal shaped whatever legal leverage
92
points existed in the course of city and state review of the development plan.
Accordingly, WE ACT employed legal tools and due diligence where possible,
but the realities of the larger political-economic dynamic often reduced their
effectiveness. Upon recognizing this dynamic, key players forced the
negotiation process and ultimately redefined the ways in which lawyering
might be effective in a thick political-economic context where development
deals proceed in the shadow of, but not determined by, the law.
This Section maps the city, state, and community processes of negotiation
and decision over Columbia's expansion. It analyzes efforts by WE ACT and
its legal team to intervene in those processes. In order to provide a platform and
"scorecard" for that discussion, we first identify the main players, their
interests, and perspectives.
A. The Stakeholders
In mapping the contours of the political struggle over Columbia's plan,
WE ACT and its legal team identified a number of interests with an important,
or potentially important, stake in the outcome. Understanding the constellation
of stakeholders swirling around the Columbia development and the ways in
which their interests might coalesce or compete with one another is an
important precursor to understanding the ways that WE ACT's political and
lawyering choices were shaped, pursued, and often frustrated. Among the
relevant stakeholders, the City administration, the City Council, and possibly a
New York State agency would all have to cooperate in and approve Columbia's
expansion. 93 Within West Harlem, the local community board, local elected
90. See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3, at 325 (describing the approach
that accountable development lawyers take to the use of litigation, stating that "FCCEJ's success
in bringing the developer to the negotiating table, for example, was premised in large part on the
threat that it could, in fact, successfully litigate the environmental claims").
91. See id. at 327-28 (describing the way in which this type of lawyering is redistributive in
the sense that the community is able to extract far more concessions from the developer than it
would otherwise be able to).
92. See infra notes 96-126 and accompanying text.
93. See infra Part IV.B. 1-2 (discussing municipal and state processes).
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officials, and an array of other community interests were mobilizing to
intervene in the development process. The following section discusses each of
these stakeholders in turn.
1. The Mayor and City Administration
Mayor Michael Bloomberg deals with development largely through his
powerful Deputy Mayor for Development, Daniel Doctoroff. Doctoroff
oversees the Department of City Planning (DCP) and other municipal agencies
dealing with land use and development. He helps the Mayor94 pick the majority

of the City Planning Commission (CPC), including its chair.

Columbia's expansion fits well with Bloomberg and Doctoroff's
articulated vision for the City. 95 Both are very wealthy men with social and
business links with Columbia's top officials and trustees. 96 Both have given up
on manufacturing as an engine of economic growth. 97 They are committed to
increasing the City's supply of affordable housing, 98 but almost exclusively in
the outer boroughs. 99 They would exile the City's working class and poor from
94. The Mayor appoints the chair (who also directs the DCP) and six members. The five
elected borough presidents each select one member, as does the elected city-wide "Public
Advocate," a kind of ombudsperson. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 192(a) (2004).
95. See Adam Brodsky, Gotham Gets Grander, N.Y. PosT, May 16, 2004, at 29 ("And
now--because Deputy Mayor Dan Doctoroff fantasizes about hosting the Olympics and Mayor
Mike needs a legacy-[New York] is headed for hyper-change with a dazzling array of giant new
projects. If even a fraction get built, it'll be hard to recognize much of the city in 10 or 20 years.");
Jonathan Mahler, The Bloomberg Vista, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, § 6, at 66 ("[T]o continue to
grow, the city was going to have to undergo a period of hyperactive development."); Sam Roberts,
Wave of Development, Cleared for Takeoff, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at B3 (describing the
mayor's plans to initiate growth and development in a number of fora, including subway
expansions, the Atlantic Yards complex, and low-income housing, as having a "pro-growth, longrange theme") (quoting Robert D. Yaro, the president of the Regional Plan Association); Brad
Lander & Laura Wolf-Powers, Remaking New York City: Can Prosperity Be Shared and
Sustainable?, PRATT INST, CTR. FOR

CMTY. &

ENVTL. DEV. (Nov. 2004), available at

http://www.prattcenter.net/pubs/remakingnyc.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
96. See Ken Auletta, The Fixer, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 12, 2007, at 46 (describing
President Bollinger as a client of the powerful public relations mogul, Howard Rubenstein, whose
client roster includes the New York elite, including Governor Spitzer and Mayor Bloomberg); Jim
Rutenberg, Mayor Says Bid Was Worth a Shot, Even Long, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at Al
(describing Doctoroff and Bloomberg as "businessmen who had made millions-in Mr.
Bloomberg's case, billions").
97. See Becky Aikman, Changing Patterns: New York's Shrinking Garment Industry Keeps
Redesigning Itself, With an Increased Focus on High Fashion and New Fads, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Aug. 17, 2003, at A29 (describing the decline of the garment manufacturing industry in New
York, suggesting that Mayor Bloomberg has not made saving manufacturing a priority, and
quoting Doctoroff as saying that the industry is changing and that "[t]here are global forces under
way... that affect not only... manufacturing in New York, but the whole country") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Lander & Wolf-Powers, supra note 95.
98. See Mahler, supra note 95 ("By setting all of this development in motion, the mayor is
seeking to sustain the city's growth-and thus ensure that there will be housing and jobs for those
who don't work on Wall Street."); Roberts, supra note 95.
99. See Mahler, supra note 95 (conceding that "[iut's far more economical for [Bloomberg]
to create affordable housing in the outer boroughs"); Lander & Wolf-Powers, supra note 95.
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Manhattan and reserve its more costly land for their world: corporate and
financial offices, museums, universities, medical, bio-tech and related research
facilities, cultural institutions, and high-end hotels restaurants and residences
for the owning, professional and managerial classes. 100
While Columbia could expect its plans to receive a generally warm
reception from the City administration, their interests were not precisely
aligned. The Mayor sought to ensure that the resentment of Columbia's
expansion would not rub off on him in Harlem or in the uptown Dominican

community.101 To that end, his administration would push for-and maybe
help fashion and fund-a CBA calculated to secure social peace. DCP
technocrats might also negotiate marginal improvements, and the CPC' °2 might

impose some limited modifications, within parameters set by Bloomberg and
Doctoroff.
2. The City Council

In addition to the mayor's office, the Columbia expansion plan also
implicated the City Council. If the City Council views a project as essentially

local, it routinely accedes to the wishes of the area's Council member. In this
case, the member for West Harlem, Robert Jackson, had initially endorsed the
expansion, but he pulled back in response to community unrest. In subsequent
public discussion of Columbia's expansion, he urged the University and
community to "reach a consensus" so he would not have "to vote on this
particular matter."10° 3 Though he seemed likely to take an interest in the public
education provisions of a CBA given his background as an education
activist, 10 4 Jackson was under no pressure to appease community activists
100. See Mahler, supra note 95 (asserting that the concentration of affordable housing in
the boroughs "will no doubt accelerate Manhattan's evolution into an island of the wealthy").
101. Cf James Traub, Bloomberg's City, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 21
(describing the mayor's effort to gain support in Harlem).
102. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 192(e) (2004) ("The city planning commission
shall oversee implementation of laws that require environmental reviews of actions taken by the
city. The commission shall establish by rule procedures for environmental reviews of proposed
actions by the city where such reviews are required by law. Such rules shall include procedures for
(1) selection of the city agency or agencies that will be responsible for determining whether an
environmental impact statement is required in connection with a proposed action and for
preparation and filing of any such statement required by law, (2) participation by the city in
environmental reviews involving agencies other than city agencies, and (3) coordination of
environmental review procedures with the land use review procedures set forth in this charter. The
director of city planning and the commissioner of the department of environmental protection
shall assign from the staffs of such departments an office of environmental coordination, which
shall provide assistance to all city agencies in fulfilling their environmental review
responsibilities").
103. Dalton Walker, Columbia Rules Out Evictions in Expansion Plan, N.Y. TIMES July
23, 2007 at B2 [hereinafter Walker, Columbia Rules Out Evictions].
104. Jackson had chaired the local school board and was co-founder and President of the
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, which won major increases in New York City's share of New York
State school funding. See Gail Robinson, The Last Word in School Funding? THE GOTHAM
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because he was ineligible for re-election under the City's term limits provisions
and was reportedly seeking to move to the State Assembly from a district that
has very little overlap with community surrounding the expansion site.
If the Council, however, viewed Columbia's expansion to be of City-wide
significance, its response would depend upon the stance of the Council speaker
and the intensity of pressure from the Mayor's office. The Council had recently
approved, over the vehement opposition of a local Council member (and other
local elected officials), a proposal, heavily promoted by Bloomberg and
Doctoroff, to level residential neighborhoods to build a Football/Olympic

stadium and large, upscale office and apartment buildings on the west side of
mid-town Manhattan. 10 5 With West Harlem's council member not even in
opposition, there was no indication that the Council would resist Columbia's
plan to displace mainly low-end small businesses in order to build world-class
research, educational, and cultural facilities. Still, major public protest in
Harlem and uptown or strong opposition from Black and Latinalo Council
members might lead the Council to seek some trade-offs or impose some
modifications.
3. The State Government

Columbia also might need cooperation (mainly eminent domain) 10 6 from
10 7
the New York State Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC),
governed by a board that is controlled by Governor Elliot Spitzer. 10 8 As the
available at,
27,
2006),
(Nov.
&
POL'Y
CITY
NEWS
N.Y.
GAZETTE
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article//20061127/200/2044 (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (detailing
the litigation launched by the Campaign for Fiscal Equity, which sought to significantly increase
funding for New York City schools). See also The Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
http://www.cfequity.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
105. See Charles V. Bagli, The Jets Miss a Deadline For a West Side Property, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2005, at B3 [hereinafter Bagli, The Jets Miss a Deadline] (discussing the proposed
complex); Mike Mclntire & Jim Rutenberg, After Stadium Bid Fails,a DisheartenedBloomberg
Worriesfor City, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at B6 (discussing the failure of the plan).
106. See infra notes 153-180 and accompanying text.
107. See McKinney Unconsolidated Laws § 6254 (2000); see also 1997 N.Y. Op. Att'y
Gen. 44 (1997) (stating that the Urban Development Corporation is doing business as the Empire
State Development Corporation); Empire State Development, http://www.empire.state.ny.us (last
visited Oct. 3, 2007). The Empire State Development Corporation is the umbrella organization for
the Urban Development Corporation, which is its biggest component and which handles mostly
publicly oriented companies. See OFFCE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, DIvISION OF STATE
SERVICES, REPORT 2005-S-6, Empire State Development Corporation Oversight of Subsidiary
at
available
(2006),
9-10
at
Operations,
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093006/05s6.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (outlining
the histories of and relationship between the Urban Development Corporation and the Empire
State Development Corporation) See generally Empire State Development Corporation,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EmpireStateDevelopmenLCorporation (last visited Oct. 3, 2007)
(detailing several of the Urban Development Corporation's major public redevelopment projects).
108. The Empire State Development Corporation was created by the Urban Development
Corporation Act, passed initially in 1968, and amended in 1975. This Act states that the nine
directors of the corporation are to be the superintendent of banks (appointed by the Governor) the
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scion of a wealthy real estate family and a graduate of Princeton University and
Harvard Law School, 10 9 Spitzer would likely be friendly to Columbia's

interests. At the same time, however, Spitzer had built his reputation on
exposing and fighting corporate abuse and had campaigned as a strong
proponent of affordable housing. It0 Moreover, his Lieutenant Governor, David
Patterson, had long served as State Senator from West and Central Harlem,
where he had been a vocal critic of gentrification. 111 While not likely to block
expansion altogether, the State administration under Spitzer and Patterson
might press Columbia to provide affordable housing and otherwise address the
problem of secondary displacement.
ESDC action in support of Columbia's expansion might require approval
from the State's Public Authorities Control Board (PACB), which includes a
representative of the Governor, State Senate Majority Leader, and State
Assembly Speaker and can act only with their unanimous agreement. "2 It was
the Speaker's refusal to approve State funding that stopped the
Football/Olympic stadium project after the City Council, Mayor, and ESDC
had all approved it. 11 3 Since neither the considerations said to underlie that

chairman of the New York State science and technology foundation, and seven directors to be
appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the state senate. The governor is to
choose the chairman and two others, who serve at his pleasure, and the four remaining are to serve
terms of four years each from their appointment (and these directors may be removed by the
governor only for cause). The governor may also appoint a president of the corporation with the
advice and consent of the state senate who shall serve at the pleasure of the governor, and he has
the power to "appoint a business advisory council for urban development, to advise and make
recommendations to the corporation with respect to development policies and programs and to
encourage maximum participation in projects of the corporation by the private sector of the
economy." McKinney Unconsolidated Laws § 6254 (2000). The members of this council serve at
the pleasure of the governor. See id.
109. See Errol A. Cockfield, Jr., Spitzer Inauguration PledgingReform, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Jan. 2, 2007, at A3 (describing Governor Spitzer's background).
110. See Charles V. Bagli, Spitzer Signals Desire to Keep Starrett City Affordable to the
Middle Class, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2007, at BI [hereinafter Bagli, Spitzer Signals Desire];
Christopher Grimes & David Wighton, The "People's Lawyer" Who Took on Big Business and Is
Now Wooing the Voters, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 24, 2004, at 11 (discussing Spitzer's
wranglings with big corporations and executives).
11.
See Usborne, supra note 43, at I (discussing gentrification in Harlem, and quoting
David Patterson, state senator from Harlem, as saying, "If Harlem retains its name but comes to
resemble the old Upper West Side, then who will have benefited? ... Not the traditional residents
of Harlem or the poor, because they will have been driven out. We will have created a new
Harlem that will be a place for Wall Street executives to live").
112. Section 51 of the New York Public Authorities Law requires PACB "approval of the
financing and construction of any project proposed by . . . [the] New York state urban
development corporation [the Empire State Development Corporation]." N.Y. PUa. AUTH. LAW §
51 (McKinney 2004). Columbia has indicated that it interprets Section 51 as requiring PACB
approval for ESDC cooperation even though it seeks no state assistance in financing or
construction of its expansion.
113. See Mike Mclntire & Him Rutenberg, After Stadium Bid Fails, A Disheartened
Bloomberg Worriesfor City, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005 at B6.
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veto 1 14 nor any others seemed to apply in Columbia's case, there was no reason
to anticipate trouble from the PACB.
4. Other Local Elected Officials
In addition to Robert Jackson, eight other elected officials represent some
part of West Harlem. One of those, the recently elected Manhattan Borough
President Scott Stringer, appoints Manhattan community boards (discussed
below) and has a public hearing and advisory role in the City's land use review
process. " 5 Although Stringer is a liberal Democrat friendly to WE ACT, he has
no vote in the land review process and seemed to lack the political clout to
make a significant impact on Columbia's plan.
Foremost among the local elected officials is Upper Manhattan's
representative in the U.S. Congress, Charles Rangel. As Harlem's
acknowledged political leader and chair of the House Ways and Means
Committee,' 16 which controls funding important to Columbia and the City and
State governments, Rangel wields great influence. Consequently, no one wants
to cross him.
Soon after Columbia disclosed its plans, Rangel told community activists
that he and Jackson would spearhead a community bargaining process with
Columbia. At the first meeting between Columbia and community
representatives, Rangel insisted that he and other Harlem elected officials have
a major role in any negotiation between Columbia and the community. 117 His
and other officials' goals and plans, however, remained a mystery, though they
to
did obtain seats on the Local Development Corporation (LDC) formed
8
negotiate a CBA and some provided the LDC with helpful staff support."1
5. The Community Board
New York City established Community Boards as part of liberal efforts to
address the upheavals of the 1960s through decentralization and opportunity for
114.

Though Sheldon Silver, the state assembly speaker who ultimately jettisoned the West

Side Stadium project, never explicitly gave reasons for his opposition, the media and others
engaged in speculation. Some of the reasons included: want of funds for his own district,
accommodation of local Democratic elected officials who vociferously opposed the project, and
opposition from State employee unions who wanted greater oversight in the selection of private
contractors for public projects. See Brian McGuire, Hamilton 's Lessons for Pataki, THE N.Y.
SUN, July 11, 2005, at 9; Mclntire & Rutenberg, supra note 113; Henry J. Stem, Op-Ed.,
Governor Silver, THE N.Y. SUN, June 30, 2006, at 9 (attributing Mr. Silver's opposition to the
stadium plan to the fact that the plan was strongly opposed by a constituent who owned Madison
Square Garden and feared competition from the new stadium).
115. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 197(c) (2004) (describing the role of the
Manhattan Borough President in ULURP review).
116.

See Ross K. Baker, A Bulls-Eye on Pelosi,L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2006, at M5.
Interview with Cecil Corbin-Mark, Director of Programs, WE ACT, who was present
at the meeting, in N.Y., N.Y. (Aug. 4,2006).
118. See infra note 186 and accompanying text (describing the composition of the LDC).

117.
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grassroots participation in municipal decision-making.' 19 Appointed by the
Borough President in consultation with local City Council members,120 and
provided with modest City-funded staff and office space, the fifty-member

boards serve as the official voices of their communities. They have a formal
advisory and public hearing role in the City's land use regulatory process and
the right to propose a local master plan with official advisory status if adopted
by the City Planning Commission and City Council. 121
The City is divided into fifty-nine districts, each with a population of

roughly one hundred thousand. Manhattan Community District 9, which
encompasses Columbia's expansion site, is more or less equally divided among
African Americans on the east and northeast, Dominicans to the north, and

Whites to the south, yielding an ethnically fragmented district with a divided
and relatively weak community board. 122 The Black population in District 9,
119. Community boards were established by the New York City Charter. See N.Y. CITY,
N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 2800 (2004). There were three stages to the community board structure in
New York City. The first began in 1969 with the community school district system, which
involved minority leaders successfully passing a law that established local school boards to be
elected by parents. See Forman, supra note 75. The city then moved on to the Office of
Neighborhood Government plan in the early 1970s, only to replace that structure with the present
community board system in 1977. See id. One of the biggest changes that characterizes the
modem community board structure is the institution of the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
(ULURP), which "mandate[s] a community board review and vote on all land use applications,
including zoning actions, special permits, acquisition and disposition of city property, and urban
renewal plans." Id.
120. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 2800(a) (2004); Amy Widman, Replacing
Politics With Democracy: A Proposal for Community Planning in New York City and Beyond, 1I
J.L. & POL'Y 135, 144 (2002).
121. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 197-a (2004). This is known as a "197-a Plan,"
named after the city charter section that authorizes a community board to propose such a plan for
adoption by the City Planning Commission and City Council as an advisory guideline for future
development of the area. Community boards or others who propose any such plan "shall submit
the plan together with a written recommendation to the city planning commission for
determinations" after a public hearing. Id. The City Planning Commission is then to determine
whether it approves the plan and, if so, is to prepare the environmental analysis for the plan. See
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 197(b) (2004). Whenever a plan is proposed that would affect
a particular community board, the plan must be referred to those community boards, and then a
public hearing is to be held. See id. § 197(c). The approval of the community boards, or lack
thereof, does not actually regulate development-it is seen as a form of advisory opinion. See
Widman, supra note 120, at 144; Forman, supra note 75.
122. District 10, to its East, is overwhelmingly African American and Afro-Caribbean, with
long established political and community leadership. See N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING,
District Profiles, http://nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/lucds/mnl0profile.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
District 7 to its South is home to a liberal white professional/managerial populace with its own
leadership structures. See Id. at http://nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/lucds/mn7profile.pdf (last visited Oct.
3, 2007). In recent years, District 12 to the North has similarly consolidated as the center of the
City's
newly
arrived
and
expanding
Dominican
community.
See
Id.
at
.http://nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/lucds/mnl2profile.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). District 9 has
evolved to contain each of these groups in roughly equal parts (though the rapidly increasing
Dominican population is hard to measure given the lag in census data and the reluctance of those
with questionable or non-existent immigration documents to make themselves known to federal
census takers). See Id. at http://nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/lucds/mn9profile.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,
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moreover, is split along class lines between low-income tenants in the public
housing projects and well-off owners of high-end brownstones and river view
condos. 123 Over the years, the better off and more politically connected Black
professional and business people have predominated on the Board, along with
white property owners and the white graduate students concentrated in the
southern end of the district near Columbia's main campus. As of 2007, the
Manhattan Community Board included only two representatives of the
growing, mainly working 24poor Dominican community that is the most
vulnerable to gentrification.
Despite its varied demographic base, District 9's community board (CB9)
25
had labored for years to put together its own unified master plan for the area. 1
The West Harlem section of CB9's plan calls for mixed light manufacturing,
commercial and affordable residential use plus waterfront development,
improved schools and services, a CBA with any outside developer, and no
eminent domain. 126 Pursuant to these guidelines, Columbia could expand
piecemeal on the land and buildings it already owned, but would be unable to
construct an integrated new campus with anywhere near the capacity and
facilities it claimed to need. CB9 was committed to fighting for its vision of
neighborhood development.
6. Other Community Players
In addition to the formal community voice channeled through the
community board, an array of community groups within and around CB9
actively responded to Columbia's planned expansion. For example, well-off,
White commercial property owners formed the "West Harlem Business Group"
2007).

123. A study by David Rogers finds that boards in wealthier and ethnically more
homogenous districts tend to be more effective, more unified, and less factionalized. See Forman,
supra note 75.
124. Dominicans have moved south from uptown to occupy most of the area due north of

the expansion site, including many units of the formerly state subsidized Riverside Park
Community Houses. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. They live mostly in rental units,
many in buildings too small to be protected under New York's rent regulation laws. See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 2100.2(f) (2006). The other neighborhoods surrounding the

expansion site are not at serious risk for secondary displacement. Due east and south east of the
expansion site are federal low-income public housing projects which will remain. See infra notes

170-172 and accompanying text. To the northeast and northwest are expensive homeowner
brownstones and riverfront condos. To the south are housing and facilities largely owned by

Columbia and other institutions; for example, Union Theological Seminary, the Riverside Church,
and The Jewish Theological Seminary. See Columbia Draft EIS, supra note 18 at Ch. 10 at 6
available at http://nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/env.-review/manhattanville/lO.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,
2007).

125. Under section 197-a of the New York City Charter, this plan would only be advisory.
See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 197-a (2004).
126. See Community Board 9 197-a Plan, PRATT INST. CTR. FOR CMTY. & ENVTL. DEV.

(June 17, 2005), available at http://www.prattcenter.net/cp-cb9-197a.php
2007).

(last visited Oct. 3,
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and retained a prominent liberal lawyer to stop Columbia from using eminent
domain. Largely White, anti-gentrification activists who had long battled with
the University over land use organized against this latest expansion through a
new "Coalition to Preserve Community." The remaining TIL tenants fought to
save their buildings or, at the very least, stay together nearby in other buildings
that they could cooperatively own through the same City program. Mirabel
Sisters, a progressive Dominican community organizing project, tried to
involve low-income residents north of the site. The uptown Dominican political
leadership, including Manhattan Community Board 12, the site of Columbia's
medical campus, offered to join forces to bargain with Columbia over its
expansion plans in both areas, but CB9 leaders rebuffed these offers.
B. Lawyering in the Shadow of Development Dynamics
Columbia, WE ACT and the other stakeholders and decision-makers
interacted, competed and colluded through three levels of simultaneous legal
process and discourse-municipal, state, and community. At the municipal
level, the expansion plan moved through the city government's environmental
and land use review processes. At the same time, Columbia initiated New York
State's processes for exercising its power of eminent domain. Alongside these
two formal legal procedures, the community and Columbia also prepared to
negotiate a CBA. What happened on one level could affect dynamics on other
levels. On all three levels, WE ACT struggled to deploy its newly enhanced
legal capacity, particularly its new in-house attorney, effectively within its
overall strategy. And throughout this process, its legal team harnessed both
traditional community lawyering efforts, discussed in this section, and new
modes of lawyering adapted to changing macro political-economic dynamics,
examined in Section V.
1. The Land Use Review Process
To move forward with even the first phase of its planned expansion,
Columbia needed the entire area to be re-zoned to allow increased density and
"academic mixed use." In New York City, re-zoning, like many other major
municipal land use decisions, requires approval through the City Charter's
Urban Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP). 117 Before starting ULURP,
127. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 197-c (2004). The City Planning Commission
has the power to "oversee implementation of laws that require environmental reviews of actions
taken by the city." Id. § 192(e). The Commission develops procedures for the selection of those
agencies who will determine whether an environmental impact statement is necessary, for the
participation by the city in the environmental reviews when agencies not the city are involved, and
for the coordination of environmental review procedures with land use review procedures. See id.
The City Planning Commission, under §197-c, is the agency with which applications under § 197
are filed, along with any recommendations or written information that is involved in the process.
See id. § 197-c(b). The CPC then must certify that applications are complete and ready to go
through the review process. See id. After the community boards and borough presidents make
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however, a proposal of any significant potential environmental impact must
first move well along in the City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR)
process.1 28 These interlinked procedures offer several opportunities for legal
and community intervention.
Public hearings, with opportunity to submit written comments, occur at
various junctures. These start early on with a DCP hearing in the community on
129
the developer's draft scope of its Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
Subsequent public hearings are held at several stages of ULURP, which starts
when the City Planning Commission (CPC) certifies that the developer's draft
EIS is ready for public release (in that it includes adequate disclosure of risks
from the project and adequate plans to mitigate those risks). 130 The community
board then has sixty days in which to hold hearings and render an advisory
opinion. 13 1 The process repeats, with shorter and longer time limits, at the
Borough President's office, the CPC, and the City Council. The Council and
Mayor (who holds no hearings) have ultimate authority. Though much of the
testimony and comments focus on the overall project plan, the vote is on the
specific proposal triggering ULURP, here re-zoning, and both the CPC and the
32
Council have authority to amend that proposal. 1
CB9 unsuccessfully sought to have the CPC approve its master plan for
the community first and disqualify any part of Columbia's plan that conflicted
with the community board's plan. Instead the Commission agreed to certify the
two plans simultaneously, so that the community board's plan would be taken
into consideration, though not necessarily followed, by CPC and the City

their recommendations, they must submit them to the CPC. See id. § 197-c(f). The Commission
may then approve, approve with modifications, or disapprove the application. See id. § 197-c(h).
The City Council and Mayor are empowered to make political decisions subject to no standards or
review. If the City Council votes no, the proposal is rejected. If it votes yes and the Mayor vetoes,
the Council can over-ride by a two-thirds majority. See id. § 197-d.
128. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 192-c (2004); 62 R.C.N.Y. § 5-01 (2006)
(describing the rules of procedure for City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR)); Cyane
Gresham, Note, Improving Public Trust Protections of Municipal Parkland in New York, 13
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 259, 285-86 (2002) (explaining that where a ULURP application is
necessary, it "will not go through without the necessary environmental review," which, in the New
York City, is CEQR).
129. Kathryn C. Plunkett, Comment, Local Environmental Impact Review: Integrating
Land Use and Environmental Planning Through Local Environmental Impact Reviews, 20 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 224-225 (2002). Although CEQR mandates only disclosure and does not
obligate the developer to take or withhold any action, this "scoping session" can range more
broadly since the EIS must cover not only physical and public health but also socioeconomic
effects of the project, and set forth plans for mitigating all identified impacts. Id. at 225.
130. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 197-c (2004).
131. The Planning Commission also takes testimony and comments on the draft EIS and
may order the EIS revised or expanded. See id. § 197-c(h).
132. See id. (explaining how the CPC can approve, approve with modifications, or
disapprove); see id. § 197-d(c) (describing that the council can approve, approve with
modifications, or disapprove); see id. § 197-d (stating that the council can override Mayor's veto
by 2/3 vote).
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33
Council in their deliberations over Columbia's re-zoning proposal. 1
CPC certified both Columbia's and CB9's plans on June 18, 2007. West

Harlem activists protested that the University and City were trying to slip
Columbia's plan through during summer months when many people are on
vacation and the community board does not regularly meet. 134 The Board
quickly approved its own 197-a plan and scheduled a public hearing on
Columbia's proposal for August 15, 2007. WE ACT and its legal team explored
several modes of intervention in this ULURP process, ranging from written

comments and litigation to community education, organizing, testimony,
lobbying, and other efforts to put pressure on decision makers.
a) Written Comments
New York law provides opportunity for individuals and groups to submit
written comments after public hearings on (i) the draft scope of a project's EIS
and (ii) the draft EIS itself.135 The project sponsor must respond in writing to
each such comment. 136 In early Winter 2005-06, WE ACT's newly arrived inhouse attorney took the lead in preparing extensive, detailed comments on the
University's draft scope of its EIS. 137 In Summer 2007, she was hard at work,
along with Fordham law students, laying the basis for WE ACT's comments on
the University's draft EIS. These tightly-reasoned, data-rich documents could
influence technical staff at the University and DCP to increase disclosure of
environmental harm (socio-economic as well as physical) and expand the
University's obligation to mitigate such harm. Disclosure provides a tool for
community education, ULURP advocacy, and CBA bargaining. Mitigation
promises provide political, if not legal, leverage for community efforts to press
the University to honor its commitments throughout the expansion process.
b) Litigation
WE ACT's legal team determined that neither the threat nor the reality of
litigation challenging Columbia's EIS was likely to provide community groups
with the kind of leverage that had helped win the Los Angeles CBAs. The Los
133. IfCB9's plan were approved, the City Planning Commission and City Council would
have only to "consider" that plan before approving the University's plan under ULURP. See N.Y.
CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 197-a (2004) (referring to a plan initiated by a community board as

a "recommendation"); Forman, supra note 75 (noting that community board plans under § 197-a
are only "advisory statements," though city agencies are obligated to consider them in their
decision-making process). Columbia also agreed, in a largely symbolic gesture, to include in its
EIS a comparison of the environmental impacts of the two plans.
134. Josh Hirschland, Protestors Decry Timing of Environmental Impact Statement,
COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR, June 1, 2007.

135. See N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, Environmental Review,
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/env review/env_review.shtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2007)
(describing the CEQR process and detailing timelines for public comment).
136. Id.
137. See WE ACT, Official Written Comments, supra note 24.
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Angeles developers feared that such litigation would delay municipal approval
until after the expected election of a new mayor who did not support their
project. 138 In New York, neither the Mayor nor the City Council were up for reelection within the period for project approval; nor were they challenged by any
potential candidate that opposed Columbia's expansion. New York courts will
not even entertain litigation until issuance of a final EIS, which comes in New
York's scheme only shortly before the ULURP process reaches its final phase
at the City Council. 139 Even then, the courts will not second guess approval of
an EIS so long as the agency provides any reasonable basis for its
conclusions. 140
For a long while, Columbia seemed impervious to delay. Unlike a forprofit developer, the University did not stand to lose significant money while it
waited. Instead, it continued to announce new, huge donations and projects as it
worked toward ULURP. 14 1 It did, however, eventually push for ULURP to
start, amidst rumors that some funders of the new campus were growing
restive. If WE ACT found glaring errors or omissions in the EIS, or major
procedural violations, litigation might help increase political leverage and buy
time to complete CBA negotiations.

138. See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3, at 318.
139. See MAYOR'S OFFICE OF OPERATION, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATION,
CEQR Technical Manual Appendix A §617.11(a) (on file with authors) available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/oec/html/ceqr/ceqrpub.shtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (stating that the
Final EIS must be issued with a Statement of Findings and available for consideration and
comment for at least 10 days before CPC can make its ULURP decision ); N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF
CITY
PLANNING,
Land
Use
Review
Procedure,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml#cpcr (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (stating that
CPC must approve, approve with modifications or disapprove the ULURP application within 60
days of the expiration of the Borough President's review period); This means litigation may not be
ripe until the CPC is nearly ready to approve the plan and send it to the City Council for review.
The New York Supreme Court has held that one may not challenge a draft EIS and must wait until
the final EIS has been promulgated. See Hell's Kitchen NeighborhoodPlanningAss n v. N.Y City
Dep't of City Planning,800 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs may not stay the
administrative approval process by proving inadequacy of a draft EIS because the suit is not ripe
and barred by a failure to exhaust administrative appeals, and that plaintiffs may challenge the
process only after the final EIS is approved).
140. See, e.g., NRDC v. US. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 399 F. Supp. 2d 386, 399 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) ("When specialists express conflicting views, the court must defer to the agency's reliance
on its own qualified experts, 'even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views
more persuasive"') (citations omitted); Akpan v. Koch, 75 N.Y.2d 561, 570 (1990) (quoting
Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d, at 416) ("While judicial
review must be meaningful, the courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency for
it is not their role to 'weigh the desirability of any action or [to] choose among alternatives."');
Roosevelt Islandersfor Responsible Southtown Dev. v. Roosevelt Island Operating Corp., 735
N.Y.S.2d 83, 96 (App. Div. 2001) ("differing conclusions reached by other experts concerning the
potential adverse environmental impacts are insufficient to annul an agency's determination").
141. See Gretchen Morgenson, Aiding the Schools That Gave Them a Chance, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2006, at F34 (discussing a $200 million donation in March 2006 from the Dawn M.
Greene and the Jerome L. Greene Foundation to establish a neuroscience center).
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c) Lobbying for Administrative andLegislative Amendments
WE ACT and its legal team were under no illusion that community efforts
could lead any level of City government to exercise ULURP power to block
Columbia's expansion by rejecting its re-zoning proposal. Columbia had built
widespread support among City leaders and in the media, and it is influential in
the City. Columbia's new science labs, and the biotech businesses that would
rise around them, offered economic growth of exactly the kind Bloomberg,
Doctoroff, and the City's business leaders sought. In October 2005, the Mayor
announced that the City would open a new Columbia-supported math/science
magnet school on the expansion site. 142 While the community would struggle
to open the school to more of its youth, and to gain access to Columbia's
resources for more of its local schools, the announced partnership reflected the
extent to which the core of Columbia's expansion was deemed afait accompli
long before the formal start of ULURP.
While neither the CPC nor the City Council would block Columbia's
rezoning proposal, a major community effort might persuade them to exercise
their City Charter authority to "approve with modifications." 143 Under New
York City's interpretation of the US Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 44 the City can impose only those
requirements that can reasonably be viewed as addressing needs directly
created by the project. 145 But this allows a great deal of leeway. For example,
the CPC or Council could reduce building height limits, prohibit certain types
of bio-research, require enhanced public transit, and increase environmental
and public health safeguards. Most significantly, the report that the City Law
Department invokes to guide City action under Nollan expressly authorizes
measures "needed to deal with 'secondary displacement' caused by a
project. 146
WE ACT and its legal team worked closely with community residents and
activists to formulate a platform of legally permissible modifications to press
upon the CPC and City Council. They began to investigate inclusionary zoning
as a means of combating secondary displacement. Under this approach, city
government allows a developer to build more on a given footprint (by building
higher and on more of the area) only if the developer sets aside for permanently
affordable housing a percentage of the floor area it gains through this density
142. See Sarah Garland, High Expectations Surround School Due to Open in Harlem, THE
NEW YORK SUN, Nov. 7, 2006, at 4; David Greenhouse, Mayor Presents School for M'Ville,
COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR, Oct. 24,2005.
143.
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER §§ 197-c(h), 197-d(c) (2004).
144. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
145. The City Law Department relies upon The Role of Amenities in the Land Use Process,
SPECIAL
COMM.
OF
THE
AsS'N OF BAR OF N.Y. CITY (1988), available at

http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/RoleofAmenitiesintheLandUseProcess.pdf
2007),
146.

Id. at 30.

(last visited Oct. 3,
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bonus. 147 Columbia's re-zoning proposal would more than triple the maximum
density allowed under current zoning. 148 An inclusionary zoning modification
would grant that density increase to the University only if it created or funded
in surrounding neighborhoods a substantial specified amount of new affordable
housing. 149
WE ACT and its legal team also sought to modify Columbia's re-zoning
proposal to include a special zoning district for the area immediately north and
east of Columbia's new campus, as proposed by Manhattan Borough President
Stringer' 50 Stringer advocated new zoning rules in this special district,
designed to reduce secondary residential displacement and other adverse
impacts of the planned expansion. WE ACT and its legal team met with
Stringer's staff in an effort to expand the boundaries of the proposed district
and strengthen the proposed new zoning rules by barring any demolition or
renovation that reduces the supply of affordable housing. They also sought to
have the CPC and City Council adopt this enhanced proposal as a modification
of Columbia's re-zoning proposal instead of moving it separately through
ULURP at a later time (as planned by the Borough President). "'
147. See Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian'sMarket: The Economics of Inclusionary
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 23, 45-46 (discussing three types of inclusionary
zoning); Jonathon Douglass Witten, The Cost of Developing Affordable Housing: At What Price?
3o B.C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REV. 5o9, 548-50 (noting that inclusionary zoning has been successful in
increasing the availability of low-income housing in several urban centers); Brian R. Lerman,
Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning-The Answer to the Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C.
ENTTL. AFF. L. REV. 383, 388-89 (listing affordable housing, economically mixed neighborhoods,
and reduced urban sprawl among the benefits of inclusionary zoning); Increasing Housing
Opportunity in New York City: The Casefor Inclusionary Zoning, POLIcYLINK & PRATT INST.
CTR. FOR CMTY. & ENVTL. DEV. (2004), availableat http://www.prattcenter.net/pubs/izreport.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
148. In this way, the re-zoning would increase vastly the market value of the land that
Columbia purchased under current zoning, giving the University a substantial financial windfall.
The density increase proposed by Columbia would exacerbate significantly many adverse impacts
of its expansion, e.g., congestion, pollution, loss of light and river views, strain on transportation
and sanitation.
149. Columbia could meet this requirement by buying and renovating existing housing or
building new housing. It could fund acquisition by, or transfer ownership to, building residents
(individually or collectively) or well-established nonprofit community-based housing providers in
West Harlem, e.g. West Harlem Group Assistance, www.whga.org, and Harlem Congregations for
Community Involvement, www.hcci.org. WE ACT calculates that if Columbia were to provide
affordable housing equivalent to 20% of its increased floor area (a typical inclusionary zoning
requirement), West Harlem would gain roughly 1,000 additional units of permanently affordable
housing.
150. West Harlem Special District:A Zoning Proposalby Manhattan Borough President
Scott M Stringer (April 2007). available at http://www.beta.mbpo.org/press/pressreleases/
file.2007-05-04.3125015854 (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). On special zoning districts to mitigate
gentrification, see Peter Marcuse, Gentrification,Abandonment and Displacement: Connections,
Causes and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U.J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 195, 231-34
& nn.63-66 (1985); Peter Marcuse, To Control Gentrification:Anti-Displacement Zoning and
Planningfor Stable Residential Districts, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 931, 935-38
(1985).
151. They also started looking into tax increment financing, widespread in California, by
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d) Community Education, Organizing,Testifying and Lobbying
The main obstacle to CPC or City Council modification of Columbia's
plan was not legal authority but political will. The CPC commissioners were
political appointees, though some had years left on their terms and histories that
suggested potential for sympathy with the community's needs. They and most
City Council members harbored grander political ambitions leaving them
loathe to step out of line. To have any chance of winning real gains in the
ULURP processes, community residents would have to mobilize to wield
political power. Such mobilization could enhance significantly their longer
term capacity to protect and advance their interests on many fronts.
To this end WE ACT's organizing, program and legal teams launched an
ambitious program of community education, organizing and action. They
encouraged and helped residents to take maximum advantage of opportunities
for public participation in ULURP hearings. Well aware of the limits, and the
co-optive potential, of such an approach absent broader action to exert power
outside formal channels,' 52 they also proposed a "lobbying" campaign via
postcards, faxes, emails, letters, personal visits, and-if need be--other
potentially more media-attracting, creative and confrontational modes of
dialogue.
The public hearing on the draft scope of Columbia's EIS in midNovember 2005 offered the first official forum for the community to express its
views on Columbia's expansion plans. WE ACT devoted major legal resources
to this event. The Fordham clinic prepared bi-lingual community handouts on
the ULURP and CEQR procedures, CBAs, examples of what other universities
had done for adjacent communities, and the main issues raised by Columbia's
plan, including housing, jobs, and the environment. WE ACT organizing staff
set up pre-hearing workshops in the African-American and Dominican
neighborhoods near the site, where Fordham law students helped residents
understand the multi-level processes and prepare to testify at the hearing. More
than eighty residents, plus local elected officials, WE ACT staff, other
community activists and even some Columbia students offered testimony
critical of the expansion plan. The hearing dragged on for hours, with Columbia
and elected officials allowed to speak first, while residents who had waited
patiently were allowed only three minutes apiece before being cut off curtly,
and many had to leave before they had the opportunity to speak.
As ULURP hearings were thought to be approaching, and as they actually
which the City would allocate for development of affordable housing a substantial percentage of

increases in property tax revenue resulting from the expansion and its secondary impacts. See
Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with Resident

Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689 (1994); see also James R. Paetsch & Roger K. Dahlstrom,
Tax Increment Financing:What It Is and How it Works, in FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
AN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE 82 (Richard D. Bingham et al. eds., 1990).
152. See Cole, Macho Law Brains,supra note 7, at 697-703.
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approached in Summer 2007, WE ACT geared up again, as its in-house
attorney, in close coordination with the group's organizing and program staff
and the Fordham clinic, set up new community workshops and presentations
for the Fordham students to prepare and lead. The goal was to deepen residents'
understanding of the multi-level decision processes, to prepare them to
intervene in ULURP through testimony, written comments, a postcard
campaign, and other direct efforts to influence key decision makers, and to
elicit their CBA suggestions and encourage their involvement in formulating
the community's CBA platform.
2. The Politicsof Eminent Domain
As Columbia moved slowly through the municipal land use review
process, it simultaneously contracted with the State's Empire State
Development Corporation (ESDC) to trigger the agency's eminent domain
powers in support of the University's expansion.' 53 The University needed
eminent domain to acquire any properties it could not purchase on the open
market and also, under a quirk of New York law, to acquire full title to the area
under the prospective site for a major part of its new campus. 154 This process
provided an additional opportunity for community participation and CB9
comment, at the separate public hearings ESDC must hold before approving the
"'general project plan" for any development that it assists. 55 It also opened a
second front of public discourse and struggle over the University's expansion
plans.
Some months after Columbia contracted with the State agency, the
156
Supreme Court of the United States upheld, in Kelo v. City of New London,
the use of eminent domain to seize private property-whether or not

153. See Letter Agreement between Columbia University and Empire State Development
Corporation (July 30, 2004) (on file with authors).
154. Columbia's draft EIS discusses the potential use of eminent domain to acquire the
land from holdouts and the land under the streets for the underground part of their campus. See
COLUMBIA DRAFr EIS, supra note 18. Columbia can acquire the land under the streets from the
city only if that land ceases to be used as a public space. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER §
383 (2004) ("The rights of the city in and to its... streets, avenues, highways, .. . and all other
public places are hereby declared to be inalienable; but upon the closing or discontinuance of any
street, avenue.... or other public place, the property may be sold or otherwise disposed of as may
be provided by law.... Nothing herein contained shall prevent the granting of franchises, permits,
and licenses in respect to inalienable property."); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(2) (McKinney 2003)
("Subject to the constitution and general laws of this state, every city is empowered.., to acquire
real and personal property within the limits of the city, for any public or municipal purpose, and to
sell and convey the same, but the rights of a city in and to its waterfront, ferries, bridges, wharf
property, land under water, public landings, wharves, docks, streets, avenues, parks, and all other
public places, are hereby declared to be inalienable, except in the cases provided for by
subdivision seven of this section.") (emphasis added).
155. See N.Y. EM. DoM. PRoc. LAW § 201 (McKinney 2002) (describing the necessity of
public hearings in the eminent domain process).
156. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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"blighted"-for transfer to other private owners, so long as there is a rational
basis for expecting the transfer to serve a public purpose.' 57 Kelo proved highly
controversial and ignited a firestorm of popular opposition to eminent
domain. 58 Jurisdictions across the country enacted restrictive legislation or
constitutional amendments against eminent domain.15 9 Although the Institute
for Justice and other libertarian groups provided major financing and
coordination for this well-organized effort, 160 many progressive community
activists and organizations joined in the call for restricted eminent domain as
well.

In West Harlem, the few remaining holdout commercial property owners
attempted to ride the wave of this rising resentment. Their West Harlem
157. See id. at 479-84.
158. See J. Daniel Cloud, Supreme Court Rules American Homes Can Now Be Seized for
Private Use, LP NEws (Wash., D.C.), Aug. 1, 2005 (criticism from the Libertarian Party); Rep.
Ron Paul, Lessons from the Kelo Decision, LEwROCKWELL.COM, July 5, 2005,
http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul259.htm
(last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (criticism from a
representative); Warren Richey, Fracas Over Home Seizures Moves to States, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Boston, Mass.), Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1215/pOlsOluspo.html?s=widep (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (citing a poll that found that public opposition to the
decision ranges from 70 to 90%); Barry Yeoman, Whose House Is It Anyway? When A City's
Quest for Renewal Means the Death of an Old Neighborhood, AARP (Magazine), May 2005,
http://www.barryyeoman.com/articles/eminentdomain.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (criticism
from AARP); Hilary 0. Shelton, Dir., NAACP Wash. Bureau, The Supreme Court's Kelo
Decision
and
Potential
Congressional
Response,
Sept.
22,
2005,
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/shelton092205.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (statement
from the NAACP); Press Release, The Am. Conservative Union, Judicial Activism Strikes Again:
Supreme Court Rules Government Can Seize Your Home (June 23, 2005), available at
http://www.conservative.org/pressroom/06232005_un.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (criticism
from the American Conservative Union).
159. See Tresa Baldas, Eminent Domain Takes a Big Hit, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 2006, at 6;
Mary M. Ross & Kristen Tolan, Legislative Responses to Kelo v. City of New London and
Subsequent Court Decisions - One Year Later, 16 J. OF AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEv. L. 52
(2006); Donald Lambro, Alabama Limits Eminent Domain, THE WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at
Al (describing Alabama as "the first state to enact new protections against local-government
seizure of property allowed under [Kelo,] a Supreme Court ruling that has triggered an explosive
grass-roots counteroffensive across the country"); S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://www.comyn.senate.gov/doc-archive/jc- other/PHSB%20and%20PPA%202005%2Obilitext.
pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (outlining the Senate bill introduced to limit eminent domain);
Rebecca S. Bender, Organizers Circulate Petitions to Limit Eminent Domain in State, THE
EUREKA
REP.
(Eureka,
Cal.),
Mar.
19,
2006,
available
at
http://www.eurekareporter.com/ArticleDisplay.aspx?ArticlelD=9290 (last visited Oct. 3, 2007)
(describing the failed referendum effort in California); Bill Peacock, Protecting PrivateProperty
Rights in Texas after Kelo, TEx. PUB. POL'y FOUND., Nov. 2005, available at
http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2005-11-08-pp-kelo.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (discussing
efforts in Texas); Legislative Action Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION, Jan. 16, 2007, availableat
http://www.castlecoalition.orglpdf/publications/State-Summary-Publication.pdf (last visited Oct.
3, 2007) (describing state legislative action after Kelo; Richey, supra note 158.
160. See Kelo v. New London: Lawsuit Challenging Eminent Domain Abuse in New
London, Connecticut, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/private-property/connecticut/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2007) (describing the case and containing links to information about the Institute's
role).
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Business Group (WHBG), led and financed by two non-resident White owners
of multiple commercial buildings in the expansion site, mounted a major
campaign to focus community struggle on opposing eminent domain. They
retained a prominent liberal lawyer, Norman Siegel, who had headed the New
York Civil Liberties Union and recently run an unsuccessful race to become the
City's Public Advocate.'61 Siegel eloquently framed the group's position as a
populist opposition to Columbia's bullying, and the owners gathered support
from the Coalition to Preserve Community and local tenants associations to
insist that Columbia "take eminent domain off the table" as a pre-condition to
any negotiations.
Under Kelo, Siegel and the WHBG had no chance of stopping Columbia's
use of eminent domain in federal court. 162 Nor did New York state courts offer
any better prospect of success under the State constitution. 63 The owners also
could not expect to block Columbia politically. There was no post-Kelo
groundswell of opposition in New York, and no major legislative effort to
restrict eminent domain. 16 Recent efforts in other parts of the City to stop the
State from using eminent domain on behalf of private developers had fallen
flat. 165 The holdout properties were located such that Columbia could not build
its new campus around them. 166 The University's strong support among City
161. See Diane Cardwell, Gotbaum is Victorious in the Runoff, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001,
at D1 (describing Norman Siegel as the former executive director of the New York Civil Liberties
Union and a candidate for public advocate); E.R. Shipp, Columbia U. Gets to Stealfrom L 'il Guy,
N.Y. DAILY NEws, July 10, 2005, at 35 (describing Norman Siegel as representing the West
Harlem Business Group).
162. For this project, Columbia invoked both the classic justification of "blight," see
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), and an expansive version of the alternative justification
accepted in Kelo. Columbia's expansion offers not only economic development (within and near
the site, and for the City as a whole), which satisfied the Court in Kelo, but also improvement of
the City's cultural, education, intellectual and scientific life. The University's September 2006
draft submission to ESDC, obtained by the Columbia Spectator under the NYS Freedom of
Information Law, makes both arguments: that the area is blighted and that Columbia's planned use
is a "civic project." See Manhattanville in West Harlem: Land Use Improvement and Civic Project
General Project Plan, Columbia University (Sept. 2006) (on file with authors); see also Erin
Durkin & Anna Phillips, Draft Plan Providesfor Eminent Domain, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR,
Jan. 31, 2007, at Al.
163. See Giovanna D'Orazio, Comment, Taking PrivateProperty to Build an UrbanSports
Arena: A Valid Exercise of Eminent Domain Powers?, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1135, 1136-44 (2006)
(describing New York state law allowing the taking of private property for public purposes or
benefit rather than public use); Nasim Farjad, Condemnation Friendly: New York's Broad
Interpretation of the Public Use Requirement Works Well for New York, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
164. See D'Orazio, supra note 163, at 1144 (describing the post-Kelo New York statute as
"explicitly stat[ing] that urban renewal is a valid public purpose and use of land for which a
municipality may extend its takings power"); Ross & Tolan, supra note 159, at 67.
165. See Charles V. Bagli & Robin Shulman, TransformingBronx Terminal Market, But At
a Steep Price, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at B1 (describing opposition to the Bronx Terminal
Market plan); Nicholas Confessore, Another Step For Downtown Brooklyn Project, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at B10 (describing opposition to Atlantic Yards plan).
166. See generally supra Part II (describing Columbia's expansion in the context of the
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and State political, economic and cultural elites made it highly unlikely those
leaders would seriously consider blocking Columbia's
expansion by
67
withholding the State's power of eminent domain. 1
Since the owners stood no chance of stopping Columbia, WE ACT and its
legal team concluded they must have some other goal. Most likely the owners
hoped that diverting community resentment into a fight against eminent domain
would position them to get a much higher price from the University. Columbia
almost certainly has set substantial money aside to mute community opposition
and buy social peace. If WHBG manipulated the community into resisting
eminent domain unconditionally, the University would lose its incentive to
spend those funds on services and facilities. Its best bet would be to pay the
funds directly to the owners in order to complete site acquisition and remove
the main focus of community protest. In that event, the owners would have
absconded with the community's benefits fund.
Whatever the WHBG's motives, WE ACT understood that conflating the
interests of commercial owners entitled to eminent domain compensation with
those of residential renters subject to displacement without eminent domain
could only benefit the owners at the expense of the renters and the broader
community. As an initial step in addressing this danger, WE ACT-while
strongly opposing eminent domain abuse by the University-persuaded the
local development corporation formed to negotiate with Columbia to reject the
owners' demand that the corporation require the University to forego any use of
68
eminent domain before the corporation would discuss a broader agreement.
This postponed the debate until a later point in the process. WE ACT hoped
that by then Columbia would have cut a deal with the owners or offered the
community sufficient benefits that the negotiating coalition was willing to
refrain from fighting the University's use of eminent domain to acquire
commercial properties. WE ACT focused mainly on building community
consensus and winning University buy-in on a valuable benefits package. It
also worked to persuade the owners' community allies that a focus on eminent
domain would not advance their interests or goals. In both efforts, WE ACT's
legal team took a major role.
Tenant leaders in the two huge public housing projects just east of the
expansion site were riled by rumors that Columbia was eying their buildings for
further expansion. WE ACT's legal team clarified that the public housing
tenants' situation differs dramatically from that of the tenants at Riverside Park
Community. 169 Riverside, like other 1970s' affordable housing, is publicly
existing neighborhood).

167.

See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.

168. Erin Durkin, LDC Defers Land-Use Demands: Eminent Domain Not a Conditionfor
CBA Talks, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR, Oct. 31, 2006 [hereinafter Durkin, LDC Defers Land-Use

Demands].
169.

See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
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subsidized but privately owned by a business corporation. Formed to maximize
return to investors, the corporation switched to market-rate housing as soon as
that become more profitable than low-moderate income housing operated with
public subsidies. By contrast, public housing-a New Deal program from the
1930s-is run by a non-profit municipal housing authority, whose function and
mission is to own and operate permanently affordable housing. 170 The legal
team was able to confirm that the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)
considered the West Harlem projects among its core properties, which it would
not sell so long it remained in the low-income housing business, and that it
171
could not sell without notice to the tenants and an extended hearing process.
They further explained to the tenant leaders that if the housing authority did not
want to sell, Columbia was far too dependent on City approvals and support to
even think of trying to force acquisition through eminent domain. Nor was
there any likelihood the State ESDC would challenge City officials in this
way. 172
WE ACT's lawyers also did their best to convince the TIL tenants that
they had nothing to gain from fighting eminent domain. These twenty one
mainly Dominican working class families had worked very hard for several
years to qualify to purchase their buildings, as a co-op, for a nominal price,
under the City's Tenant Interim Lease program. 173 Unfortunately the buildings
170. See National Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (stating that it is the policy of the
federal government to promote the general welfare by helping States address and remedy the lack
of affordable housing available to low-income residents); N.Y. PuB. Hous. LAW § 401
(McKinney 1989) (constituting the New York City Housing Authority as a nonprofit public
corporation); Rachell Blatt, Public Housing: The Controversy and the Contribution, in CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING (Rachell Blatt, et. al., eds, 1986).
171.
Telephone interview with Judith Goldiner, Senior Attorney, N.Y. City Legal Aid
Society, and counsel to the City-wide federation of public housing tenants associations, N.Y.,
N.Y. (Apr. 12, 2005). Nor has the New York City Housing Authority been making use of the
federal Hope VI program under which large numbers of public housing units are destroyed to
create lower-density, mixed-income mixed-use projects. See Nigal Pindell, Is There Hope for
Hope VI?: Community Economic Development and Localism, 35 CONN. L. REV. 385 (2003)
172. New York State does have legal authority to take municipal properties. See N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2007) (stating that the state must compensate municipal corporations
for their land when they take it in exercising eminent domain).
173. The Tenant Interim Lease Program is designed to permit tenant associations to
organize into cooperatives through which they purchase apartments in city-owned buildings for
$250, so long as the associations meet certain requirements. See Rehabilitation: Tenant Interim
Lease Apartment Purchase Program, N.Y. CITY DEPT. OF Hous. PRES. & DEV.,
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/developers/til.shtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). The tenant
groups purchase a liability insurance policy and then sign an 11-month lease with the Department
of Housing Preservation and Development ("HPD"), and the HPD provides funding for major
repairs, and, once the tenants leam to manage the buildings, they may purchase them. See Nancy
A Brownstein, Comment, The Warranty of HabitabilityAs Applied to New York City In Rem
Housing: A Premature Promise, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 1103, 1109 n.38 (1984). The tenant
association must demonstrate "the tenants' desire and ability to self-manage;" additionally, once
the associations have been accepted, they must "maintain and manage the buildings in which they
live." N.Y. CITY DEPT. OF Hous. PRES. & DEV., supra. The buildings are formerly abandoned
tenements taken over by the City through real estate tax foreclosure, and therefore are known as
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they expected to purchase are inside the expansion site and still owned by the
City, which is negotiating their transfer to Columbia. 174 Since the University's
excavation and construction will make the area un-liveable over the next thirty
years, the tenants' best outcome would be to move, at City or University
expense, to comparable nearby buildings that they would be entitled to
purchase through the same City program. Given that the main decision is the
City's, the tenants' primary approach to winning this outcome has to be
organizing pressure on City officials and winning a seat in the negotiations to
determine their fate. WE ACT lawyers emphasized that fighting eminent
domain would only divert the tenants' limited time and resources and would
not help them because the City did not need eminent domain to sell its own
buildings. In July 2007, as CB9's ULURP hearings on Columbia rezoning
proposal approached, the University publicly renounced using eminent domain
to take any residential buildings on the expansion site, while continue
to
175
negotiate acquiring the buildings from their public and nonprofit owners.
Separating the anti-gentrification activists of the Coalition to Preserve
Community from the owners' eminent domain campaign required a different
approach. This "odd-couple" alliance reflected a tendency among some
progressive activists across the country to support business and Libertarian-led
campaigns against eminent domain. WE ACT and its lawyers understood the
roots of that alliance in the history of abusive "urban renewal" that had leveled
working-class communities of color in many cities 176 . In New York, this
resentment proved especially strong in response to Robert Moses and his
successors, 177 and was further aggravated in Harlem by Columbia's infamous
history of pushing tenants out to take over neighborhoods near its main
campus. 178 Still, WE ACT and its legal team strongly disagreed with efforts to
focus community response to Columbia's expansion on the issue of eminent
domain. They argued that such an emphasis privileges and empowers landowners instead of residents. It demonizes a neutral legal tool and ignores the
"in rem" buildings. ld; see generally Frank Braconi, In re in Rem: Innovation and Expediency in
New York's Housing Policy, in HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY:
FACING THE FUTURE 93 (Michael H. Shill ed., 1999) (describing New York City's In Rem
housing program, which transfers ownership of residential properties obtained through in rem real
estate tax foreclosure from the city to tenant co-ops, non-profit organizations and private, forprofit owners, and highlighting some of the challenges associated with the TIL program).
174. See Durkin, Relocation Discussions,supra note 37.
175. It did carefully reserve its right to use eminent domain to gain ownership of
commercial properties. Walker, ColumbiaRules Out Evictions, supra note 103.
176. See Barbara Bezdek, To Attain "The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle": LocalResident Equity Participationin Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 61-63 (2006) and
sources cited therein.
177. See CARO, supra note 64.
178. See Bagli, Columbia, In a Growth Spurt, supra note 16; Denny Lee, On the Heights,A
Chill Wind Begins to Blow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, § 14, at 1; Columbia's History of
Displacing
Communities,
COAL.
TO
PRES.
COLUM.,
available
at
http://www.stopcolumbia.org/contenttview/44/59/langen/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
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positive uses of eminent domain; for example in Boston's Roxbury section, a
democratically accountable community organization used eminent domain to
acquire absentee-owned land for development to benefit poor and workingclass residents. 179 Moreover, blanket opposition to any use of eminent domain
serves to strengthen the well-financed, nationally coordinated, right-wing, neoliberal effort to weaken government, roll back the regulatory state, undo the
New Deal, and insulate private property from any public regulation or
control. 0
The impact of these efforts at persuasion was unclear. While the public
housing and TIL tenant leaders sometimes seemed convinced, they also
remained loyal to the owners and hopeful that the expansion could be stopped.
The WE ACT lawyer and Fordham students were relative newcomers who had
no history with the tenants. Though the owners did not live in West Harlem,
they had long been present there. They provided leadership and resources in
opposition to Columbia, and offered a simple position that resonated with the
tenants' understandable resentment of the University. While the legal team's
talk might help over time, the CBA negotiations provided a far more effective
vehicle for weaning the tenant leaders from the owners' misdirection. As the
community learned more about the benefits that Columbia could provide and
recognized that the University could not realistically be stopped, WE ACT
hoped it would become clear that the interests of the tenants and most of the
community would best be served by giving up opposition in exchange for
valuable facilities and services. It was to this task that WE ACT and its legal
team devoted their main energy.
3. Negotiatingfor a Community Benefits Agreement
Alongside the municipal and state processes, a third expansion decision
process unfolded within the community and between it and the University.
During the first phase of this third process, the community was determining
what it wanted from the University in terms of funds, services, facilities,
modification of expansion plans, and access to facilities on the new campus. In
the second phase, the community would negotiate with the University to
hammer out a binding contract by which it agreed to accept and possibly
support expansion in exchange for specific benefits. Given that there is no real
179. MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 60; See also a number of New Deal projects, including
early Robert Moses projects in New York such as public beaches (e.g., Jones Beach, Orchard

Beaches) and working class housing developments (e.g., Co-op City, Stuyvesant Town). See
CARO, supra note 64; Ross & Tolan, supra note 159, at 79 (discussing City of Hercules,
California, use of eminent domain against Wal-Mart to prevent "urban blight" from its planned
construction of a big box store on the site); Nicolai Ouroussoff, Complex, ContradictoryRobert
Moses, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2007, at E3 1.

180. See Elizabeth Martinez & Arnoldo Garcia, What is Neoliberalism?A BriefDefinition
for Activists, CORPWATCH, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=376 (last visited Oct. 5,
2007) (defining neoliberalism).; SPACES OF NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 62,
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possibility of stopping the expansion, and only small hope of modifying it
through ULURP, this process offered the community its main opportunity to
protect and advance its interests.
Columbia was under intense pressure to enter into such a community
benefits agreement. Deputy Mayor Doctoroff and other City leaders insisted on
it. Columbia needed it to avert a public relations disaster comparable to 1968.
The community's primary leverage was the threat of angry Black and Latina/o
protests on the national news and the internet. That could impose major costs
on the University's marketing efforts and drive prospective students, faculty
and donors into the open arms of the University's Ivy League and downtown
competitors. It would tarnish severely the reputation of Columbia's new
president Lee Bollinger, a prominent liberal constitutional law teacher, best
known for his role in defending affirmative action at the University of
Michigan, 181 who had staked his legacy on successful expansion. Controversial
protests might even push the City Council to modify or stall Columbia's plans.
Doctoroff moved behind the scenes to orchestrate bargaining between the
University and the community. He allocated $250,000 in City funds to support
community participation in CBA negotiations, and he could be expected to
prod and assist the parties to reach an agreement which enabled Columbia to
expand without major community protest. When the community took longer
than expected to build the trust and capacity required for effective bargaining
with Columbia, the Deputy Mayor slowed down the municipal review process
in the hope that a CBA could be negotiated before the expansion plan reached
the City Council.
The threshold question was who would speak for the community. WE
ACT, in close communication with the groups that led the Los Angeles CBAs,
moved early to involve a broad cross section of the community in discussion of
what could be won, not only in urgently needed facilities and services, but in
longer-term community capacity, control and ownership. With Boston's
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative 82 and its own waterfront work as
models, WE ACT called for a broad democratic visioning process which would
bring grassroots residents together with experienced activists, nonprofit
organizations, labor unions and progressive experts in a powerful coalition
comparable to those forged in the Los Angeles CBA struggles. WE ACT
attempted to open discussion with leaders of the uptown Dominican
community-home of Columbia's large medical campus-to join forces, so the
two could negotiate more effectively with Columbia regarding its plans in both
districts. WE ACT prepared to reach out to the unions that represent
Columbia's employees, hoping to harness the crucial clout and capacity that
organized labor had brought to successful CBA coalitions in Los Angeles and
181.
(2003).
182.

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
Medoff and Sklar, supra note 60.
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Milwaukee. It sought potential allies among the broad range of groups meeting
coalition for accountable, equitable, and sustainable
to form a city-wide
83
development. 1
Columbia and Doctoroff quickly moved to undermine WE ACT's efforts.

Uneasy with the deeply democratic process and powerful coalition WE ACT
envisioned, they insisted instead on negotiating only through CB9. This move
proved shrewd. The community board looked official, legitimate and
representative. Only insiders were aware of its political fragmentation and
disarray, its lack of organizational capacity and resources, its parochialism and
its virtual exclusion of the growing Dominican community north of the
expansion site. WE ACT's leaders had stopped serving on the community
board to focus on other activities. Seizing the opportunity to take center stage,
CB9 leaders abandoned their prior waterfront alliance with WE ACT, accepted
Columbia's invitation and proceeded to criticize WE ACT for failing to
acknowledge CB9's primacy. They also rejected collaborative overtures from
the uptown Dominican community board, refusing to include "outsiders" in the
process.
CB9 obtained a persuasive legal opinion that it could not act effectively as
a CBA coalition because, as an agency of the City, it did not have statutory
authorization to negotiate with Columbia and lacked independent capacity to
sue to enforce a contract.18 4 It therefore formed a separate nonprofit tax exempt
corporation, "D9 Local Development Corporation," to negotiate and contract
with the university. 81 5 Creating a nonprofit corporation in New York takes only
a week or two. The political struggle over how to structure the new LDC, who
183. This coalition, Re-Defining Economic Development or RED NY, was developed to
"create a blueprint that offers a comprehensive and alternative vision of what development should
look like in the Bloomberg era." Mark Winston Griffith, Redefining Economic Development,
& POL'Y (Feb.
2006),
available at
GAZETTE
N.Y.
CITY NEWS
GOTHAM
(last visited
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/communitydevelopment/20060224/20/1771
Oct. 3, 2007); see also Redefining Economic Development NYC: Creating A Blueprint for New
JUST.
N.Y.,
Movement,
JOBS
WITH
York
City's
Progressive
Development
http://www.nyjwj.org/red.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). Sponsoring organizations include Jobs
with Justice New York, the Brennan Center for Justice, Good Jobs New York, and the Pratt Center
for Community & Environmental Development. See id. The goal was to figure out how to get
more public benefits from those developments that were being subsidized or incentivized by the
city or state. Id. Jobs with Justice's lead organizer had recently arrived from Los Angeles, where
she had played a central role in winning the first CBAs. See Urban America Takes a Stand on
Wal-Mart, L.A. ALLIANCE FOR A NEW ECON., http://www.laane.org/walmart/pressbios.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2007) (including a biography of Adrianne Shropshire, current executive director of
Jobs with Justice New York, that also identifies her with AGENDA (Action for Grassroots
Empowerment and Neighborhood Development Alternatives) of Los Angeles).
184. Memorandum from the Brennan Center for Justice to Members of the Rezoning Task
Force of Community Board 9 (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with authors).
185. A Local Development Corporation (LDC) is a special type of New York State
nonprofit. N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 2005). This section lays out the
process that permits incorporation of not-for-profit corporations for public purposes and outlines
the powers and functions of an LDC. See id.
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86
would be represented and who would control, lasted more than a year.
Not surprisingly, the contradictions and weaknesses that undermined CB9
were largely exported into the LDC. As of July 2007, the bargaining group
included only two members from the growing Dominican community. Only
two of the African American members were low-income or working class. The
LDC was fragmented and initially ineffectual. It had very few resources,
minimal expertise and limited vision. Its legitimacy was contested vehemently
87
in some sectors of the community, and even by some of its own members.1
Initially excluded from the process of structuring the LDC as well as from its
board, WE ACT did not regain traction until summer 2006, when the local
community-based organizations chose WE ACT's director of programs,
recently reappointed to CB9, to represent them on the LDC.
With the LDC still in disarray, WE ACT had to move quickly on a
number of important fronts. It succeeded in having seats added to the LDC
board for an education advocate, youth representative, TIL tenants' leader, and
arts and cultural worker. WE ACT tried hard to recruit the African American
principal of an innovative local public school to take the education seat. It
convinced the LDC to seek community input through a series of open meetings,
and launched its own efforts to prepare local residents. WE ACT's director of
programs played an active role in an informal LDC steering committee, which
included the CB9-appointed LDC chair and staff assigned to the LDC by the
Borough President and the local State Assemblyperson.
WE ACT worked hard to enlist the active support of labor unions, well
aware of the valuable political clout and organizational capacity they had
contributed to other CBAs, especially in Los Angeles. 188 This proved difficult
due to key contextual differences. In Los Angeles, major unions needed
community support to help them secure contracts with new employers at the
new development. 8 9 The unions representing Columbia employees, by
contrast, already had contracts with the University and did not need community
support to extend those agreements to jobs at the new campus. In Los Angeles
a foundation of community-labor cooperation had been built over several

186.

CB9 eventually agreed on an LDC board of 13, later expanded to 17, and then to 26 to

accommodate representatives of each elected official whose district includes any part of
community district 9. See West Harlem Land Development Corporation Website,
http://www.westharlemldc.org/Board_Members.html

(last visited Oct. 3, 2007). The LDC board

includes 2 representatives designated by CB9 itself. Id. The others are selected by various
community groups and sectors, including 6 tenant/co-op groups ranging from low to middle
income and 4 representatives of property, business or home owners. Id.
187. See Anna Philips, LDC Criticized at Public Forum, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR,
March 28, 2007. (describing two LDC members' participation in a protest against the LDC,
especially its failure to make renunciation of eminent domain a pre-condition of negotiations with
the University).
188. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3 at 320.
189. id. at 317.
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years. 190 In New York, efforts to forge such cooperation were only just
beginning, and activists of color remained bitterly skeptical of unions due to a
long history of racial discrimination, especially in the building trades."'9 As of
mid-July 2007, WE ACT had been unable to open dialog with the unions
representing Columbia employees, and the LDC had refused to reserve a seat
for a union representative.
Keenly aware of the immense resource disparity between the University
and the community, WE ACT worked with its legal team to find progressive
experts who could work pro bono. It struggled to salvage the balance of the
$250,000 Doctoroff had provided for LDC operations, nearly half of which had
already been spent on a White, out-of-town "facilitator" who had no relevant
experience and provided no apparent services. WE ACT helped convince
Doctoroff to stall ULURP, won rejection of the owners' demand that the LDC
require Columbia to forswear eminent domain before the community would
negotiate, and explored possible alliances with city-wide organizations. It also
wrestled with the upshot of the LDC's decision, just as WE ACT entered, to
retain as its "pro bono" counsel a politically connected law firm, recruited by
Doctoroff, that represents New York City's major developers and had designed,
92
on behalf of its developer client, the sham Bronx Terminal Market CBA. 1
WE ACT struggled to help the LDC take advantage of the firm's expertise and
contacts while averting the dangers posed by its political conflict of interest.
These were merely opening skirmishes. In July 2007, with ULURP
already underway, the LDC was only beginning to assemble a team of experts,
complete community consultation, formulate a CBA platform and negotiate
with Columbia. Late in 2006 the LDC and University exchanged letters that
indicated interest in addressing the same basic issues: housing, education,
health, jobs, environment, etc., though not in the same manner or scope. By that
time the LDC had organized itself into eleven working groups. 193 The

environmental working group, led by WE ACT, met frequently and drew up a
detailed list of "asks." But most of the groups were slow in starting their work.
The goal was to assess what the community most needs-within and
beyond the expansion site-and what Columbia is in position to provide. The
University's major, world-class schools of education, medicine, and public
190.
191.

Id. at 315.
See, e.g., Browne J. Zamgba, Harlem Fightback takes on racism at the BTEA, New

York Amsterdam News, October 25, 2000.

192.

See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.

193.
See Jimmy Vielkind, How to Mediate Manhattanville:A New Negotiating Partneris
Born, CITY LIMITS WKLY., Dec. 4, 2006, at 1 (discussing the formation of working groups for
CB9). These groups included: housing; business and economic development; employment and
jobs; education; historic preservation; community facilities/social services; arts and culture;
environmental stewardship; transportation; research and laboratory activities; and green spaces.

See
West
Harlem
Local
Development
Corporation,
http://www.westharlemldc.org/CommunityBenefitsAgreemen.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
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health offer great potential for synergy. Columbia could provide funds and
services in support of vastly expanded and improved public schools and
community health centers, which would offer training opportunities for its
graduate and professional students and burnish its public image. Similar
synergy might develop around some environmental issues, in coordination with
Columbia's extensive architecture, planning and environmental programs and
centers.
The issue of housing presents the LDC with particularly intense crisis and
opportunity. Left alone, Columbia's expansion would escalate the gentrification
of West Harlem, rapidly pricing out poor and working-class residents, and
leaving them unable to benefit from CBA gains. With a good CBA, the
community could harness Columbia's resources to protect affordability, build
thriving mixed-income, mixed-race communities and gain community
ownership and control over land and buildings.
A good CBA could improve the lives of local residents, strengthen their
capacity to win future battles and help build long-term structures for grassroots
democratic participation. With much at stake, WE ACT was forced to strain its
limited resources while maintaining its other important programs. It had to rely
significantly on the lawyers and law students working with and within it. The
lawyers and law students had the opportunity to forge new approaches to
community lawyering in the heat of new forms of community struggle.
IV
INTEGRATIVE LAWYERING

WE ACT's role in the ongoing community response to Columbia's
expansion project highlights both the limitations of traditional legal levers in
the thick political economic context of urban development and the demands
placed on community-based lawyers operating within this context to navigate
the political and economic forces that shape contemporary urban development
dynamics. Lawyers working with and for environmental justice advocacy

organizations have grown accustomed to using existing legal frameworks in an
attempt to strengthen the political power of groups and interests in the
community. 194 In this way, traditional environmental justice lawyering is
interest-forcing, seeking to take advantage of the pluralist competition of
interests by enhancing the power of vulnerable populations, particularly as
against more entrenched, powerful interests. As in this case study, attorneys use
the procedural tools embedded in land use laws, namely, the opportunity for
public testimony and comment on proposed development projects, both to
organize residents and to form coalitions of interests around the common goal
194.

See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 3, at 121-30 (reviewing environmental justice

lawyers' efforts at using civil rights and environmental law to transform land use decision making
processes which have an adverse, disparate impact on low-income and racial minority
communities).
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of contesting the development and influencing public officials' ultimate
decisions.1 95 Although this was not a viable strategy in the Columbia expansion
case, attorneys also often use such tactics to delay the regulatory process in the
hope that the developer will eventually back out or make concessions. As we
have shown, this interest-forcing strategy has significant limitations in a
political economic environment in which interest group influence on city
decision makers has been significantly weakened, due to the increasing
economic dependence of cities
on pursuing and accommodating private capital,
96
investors, and developers. 1
As the many facets of their evolving strategy illustrate, WE ACT and its
legal team have been impelled to step outside of the legal regulatory framework
and engage in pluralistic bargaining and negotiation both with other community
stakeholders (especially around CBA demands and eminent domain issues) and
with the developer, Columbia, itself. Both Columbia and the City appear to
have aligned interests in preventing a public relations disaster from the
development project. WE ACT and other community interests are attempting to
leverage that threat in order gain further influence and control over
development in West Harlem.
Thus, WE ACT and its legal team are in the process of shifting from a
strategy primarily geared toward responding and reacting to Columbia's
proposed plan to one designed to strengthen and leverage the capacity of the
community (particularly those members who have the least voice and influence
in the process) to become a "player" in its own development and revitalization.
This shift will require more than crafting a political strategy aimed at
influencing public decision makers, whose ability to control the social and
economic destiny of their neighborhoods has significantly declined. Instead,
WE ACT must change the dynamics of development by situating itself as a
195. Luke Cole advocated using the requirement for public participation in environmental
and land use laws as a strategy very early on in environmental justice legal advocacy. He found
early success with this strategy in Kettleman City, California, where he was able to convince a
state court to require that the Environmental Impact Report be translated into Spanish so that the
predominantly Spanish-speaking community could meaningfully participate in the public
comment process. See Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 7; see also Cole, Macho Law
Brains,supra note 7, at 697-703 (describing and embracing the "power model" of environmental
justice advocacy which views the public participation process as largely co-optive of community
opposition but nevertheless useful "as a vehicle for organizing communities and a means to
community empowerment").
196. Pluralism was never the ideal model to resolve highly contentious public issues,
particularly those involving contested land use issues which almost always involve stark
inequalities in economic power, knowledge and opportunities to shape the development plan
among the stakeholders (particularly as between developers and affected, often low income,
communities). Pluralist decision making processes almost always favor the developer due to the
simple fact that opportunities for public participation most often come after the development
proposal or plan has been crafted and preliminarily agreed upon by the developer and the local
government. See COLE & FoSTER, supra note 3, at 106-14 (critiquing the pluralist model in the
environmental justice context); see also Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public
Participationand the ParadigmParadox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998).
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force to which both the city and private investors must be accountable. In this
effort, WE ACT's legal team could play a major role in helping to structure
new accountable participatory community institutions which control land use
through community land trusts' 97 and that have a major voice-if not a vote or
veto-in West Harlem housing, education, health care, social service and
environmental decisions. They could help design creative financial
arrangements though which Columbia's wealth leverages private and public
funds for land trusts and local nonprofit housing developers to acquire,
renovate and operate, affordable diverse residential options. They also could
help draft the community's CBA platform and negotiate an effective,
enforceable agreement.
The shift from reacting to contemporary development dynamics to
proactively reshaping them fundamentally transforms the relationship between
community based organizations like WE ACT and its lawyers and legal
expertise. To be effective in this transformative project requires that
community based lawyers work "integratively" in two necessarily
interconnected ways. In their work, the lawyers-like their clients-need to
integrate flexibly and functionally a broad range of practice areas, skills and
roles. And they need to make sure that all of their work is thoroughly integrated
into the overall strategy, program and process of the organization so that their
lawyering is closely tied to the organization's efforts to build community
capacity and power. Each form of integration shapes the other.
The first type of integration-role integration-isdiscussed extensively
in the literature on community lawyering. 198 At their best community lawyers
flexibly integrate a wide array of roles to collaborate innovatively as partners
with community groups. However, very rarely are these lawyers fully
integrated into the community based organization's decision-making and
operations. This second type of integration--organizationalintegration-is

largely absent from the community lawyering literature, which understandably
focuses on small, informal grassroots groups. 199 Analysis of this type of
197. Community Land Trusts are nonprofit accountable local entities that hold title to land
and lease it to co-ops, homeowners, mutual housing associations, nonprofit community based
developers, etc. under lease agreements that enforce long term affordability. See Kirby White &
Charles Matthei, Community Land Trusts, in BEYOND THE MARKET AND THE STATE: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 41 (Severyn T. Bruyn & James Meehan eds., 1987);
see also Community Land Trusts (CLTs), COMMUNITY-WEALTH.ORG, http://www.communitywealth.org/strategies/panel/clts/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007); Community Land Trust

Resource Center, BURLINGTON

Assocs.,

http://www.burlingtonassociates.com/resources/

archives/clt_101/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).

198.

See infra notes 201-219 and accompanying text. Our concept of role integration is

similar to Scott Cummings' "tactical pragmatism," infra note 220.
199. Most of the literature on community lawyering focuses on work with grassroots

groups, often informal or newly forming, without substantial political or organizational
experience, formal education, funds, capacity or resources. See, e.g., Michael Diamond,
Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood,32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 10830 (2000); David Dominguez, Getting Beyond Yes to Collaborative Justice: The Role of
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integration is especially important now as environmental and other social
justice organizations increasingly begin to engage the complex process of urban
development on behalf and in support of low-income communities and
communities of color and as, like WE ACT, they approach a scale of operations
which makes in-house counsel practically and economically feasible.
To decide whether and how such groups can integrate staff lawyers
effectively, we need to examine similar processes both inside and outside of the
environmental and social justice worlds. Corporate in- house counsel for major
business and nonprofit entities may offer some helpful models for communitybased organizations that need transactional lawyering to help develop and
manage large-scale housing, healthcare and education projects. 2" For WE
ACT and its counterparts, however, a more fruitful source of models for fully
integrated lawyering is the work of in-house counsel for labor unions,
especially in periods of intense organizing and struggle. This Section will draw
upon the literature on community lawyering, community economic
development, and labor lawyering to examine the efforts of WE ACT's legal
team in the struggle over Columbia's expansion and explore possibilities for
Negotiation in Community Lawyering, 12 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'y 55, 57-59 (2005);
Gerald P. Lopez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around Community Knowledge, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 59-62 (2004); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On
Mapping the Paths From Rhetoric to Practice, I CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 161 (1994) [hereinafter
White, Collaborative Lawyering]; Lucie E. White, "Democracy" in Development Practice:
Essays on a Fugitive Theme, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1073, 1077-78 (1997) [hereinafter, White,
Democracy in Development Practice]. Of the few articles that discuss community lawyering for
larger, stable, developed organizational clients, such as ACORN, most advocate and describe a
very restricted role for the lawyer. Much like a plumber or repair person, she is brought in for a
specific job-generally litigation, usually on defense-and then gets, or is moved, out of the way.
See Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1
(1984-85); William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for
Empowerment of Community Organizations,21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 455, 474 (1994) (quoting an
organizer as saying that "the lawyer should be on tap, and not on top") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
200. Indeed, community economic development practice does often pair more established,
high-capacity organizations with lawyers who sometimes aspire to emulate corporate house
counsel. For the most part, however, the lawyers provide technical assistance in complex real
estate transactions involving intricate debt, equity and bond financing including a variety of
federal and state tax credits. See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3, at 309; Martha
Minow, Lawyeringfor Human Dignity, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'v & L. 143, 163 (2003).
Much of the lawyering is provided by major firms pro bono or by smaller specialty private firms
remunerated through project financing. See Thomas H. Morsch, Discovering TransactionalPro
Bono, 72 UMKC L. REV. 423 (2003) (discussing the pro bono work that transactional lawyers do
in the community economic development context). At least one legal services program, however,
has developed a far more collaborative client-centered approach to CED lawyering, which is
chronicled in a law review account by a long-time participant and co-author of this article. See
Brian Glick & Matthew J. Rossman, Neighborhood Legal Services as House Counsel to
Community-Based Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice: The EastBrooklyn Experience, 23 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 105, 158 (1997) (describing approach of Brooklyn Legal Services
Corporation A, which aspires to provide client groups with "not only (almost) all traditional
lawyering but also the full range of practical and strategic services which private sector
corporations routinely expect of their counsel").
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more deeply integrating legal capacity into (and across) the organizational
structure and functioning of WE ACT and similar community-based groups.
A. Role Integration

Integration of an expansive set of roles is widely observed and advocated
in accounts of community lawyering. Lucy White identifies three
complimentary dimensions of such lawyering: advocacy to change the law, to
transform values in dominant cultures and to change the consciousness of poor
people and their lawyers. 201 Michael Diamond calls for "activist lawyers" to
help community clients design non-legal as well as legal strategies for building

power, to present and advocate options and to help organize the groups and
resources required to implement them. 2 02 An account of one pioneering effort

shows CED lawyers acting not only as transactional counsel but also "as
tacticians and key members of management strategy teams,... interpreters....
lobbyists and propagandists, facilitators and negotiators." 20 3 A recent article on
the emerging accountable development strand of CED finds lawyers playing
the roles '2of4 "broker, negotiator, drafter, counselor, advisor, researcher, [and]

litigator. ,

0

These and other accounts reveal a rough, tentative taxonomy of expansive
overlapping roles to be mastered and integrated by lawyers working in and with
community based organizations like WE ACT. These include litigator and
20 7
litigation

analyst, 20 5

transactional

lawyer, 20 6

political

strategist,

201. See White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 199, at 157-58; Lucie E. White, To
Learn and To Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 699
(1988) [hereinafter, White, Lessons from Driefontein].
202. See Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 108-30 (2000).
203. Glick & Rossman, supra note 200, at 119.
204. Liegeois & Carson, supra note 53, at 187.
205. In acting in this role, lawyers assess possible court or administrative actions, claims
and defenses; their costs and their potential for achieving various ends (damages, injunction, law
change, delay, public education, community empowerment, official exposure and embarrassment,
discovery, government or corporate concessions, etc.); and either represent the organization or
arrange and monitor such representation. See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3, at
326-28. These elements fit into lawyering in White's first dimension as well as, to some degree,
her second. See White, CollaborativeLawyering, supra note 199, at 157-58.
206. For example, helping to structure, memorialize, monitor and implement deals and
projects; choosing, designing and maintaining legal entities; drafting and analyzing agreements;
providing basic information on corporate, tax, contract, and real estate law; and providing
regulatory counseling and representation. See Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3,
at 27; Glick and Rossman, supra note 200; Gross, supra note 52, at 11-14.
207. For example, analyzing political and legal leverage points and ways to exploit them;
helping map formal and informal decision processes; helping identify and mobilize sources of
support; helping neutralize or weaken potential opposition; helping build alliances and resolve
conflicts; and helping design, evaluate and adapt structures and processes for community power.
See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner'sReflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 301, 306 (1996); Cummings, MobilizationLawyering, supra note 3 at 325.
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negotiator, 20 8 community educator, 20 9 broker, 2 1° writer, 211 lobbyist, 2 12 and staff

member. 21 3 These roles are intricately interdependent and mutually supportive.
Role integration requires that lawyers working for community based
organizations learn how to move fluidly from one role to another, to combine
roles, and to shift flexibly back and forth between background support and
more public, prominent roles. In the community lawyering context, this role
integration is often performed through collaborative partnerships between
community based clients and outside lawyers. One illuminating example of this
type of relationship is the clinic that CUNY Law School dedicates exclusively
to working with the Welfare Rights Initiative (WRI) in New York City.214 WRI
formed in the mid-1990s to help welfare recipients enrolled at CUNY stay in
the draconian work requirements imposed by federal welfare
school despite
"reform." 215 The law clinic collaborates with WRI in a number of ways. It
provides legal training and support for WRI's lay advocates, staff and
208. For example, acting formally or behind the scenes; within the community; with
potential allies and adversaries; and with public officials, developers, etc.; helping to formulate
"win-win" approaches where possible; otherwise, to formulate demands, identify deal breakers,
assess trade-offs, devise and evaluate bargaining tactics. See Dominguez, supra note 199, at 56
209. For example, helping grassroots community members to understand the decision
processes, their participation rights, the players, stakes, possibilities and trade-offs; helping them
prepare to exercise their rights (e.g., testimony at hearings, written comments) and to fight for
additional opportunities to intervene; and learning their needs, experiences and ideas. This is
White's third dimension lawyering. See White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 199 and
accompanying text. It requires lawyers who are "multi-lingual" not only in Spanish, English and
other languages but also in their fluency in both community vernacular and legal, bureaucratic and
business jargon.
210. For example, helping identify and involve sources of expertise, funds, access,
information, and influence; and helping involve other community, city-wide, etc. groups and
institutions. See Glick & Rossman, supra note 200, passim (1997); White, Collaborative
Laiwyering, supra note 199 at 166.
211. For example, conceptualizing, drafting, and editing legislative, regulatory, project,
policy and funding proposals, testimony and written comments, position papers, reports, press
releases, leaflets, agreements, etc. Liegeois & Carson, supra note 53 at 187; Cummings,
Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3 at 321.
212. For example, helping to influence law makers, and other decision makers and opinion
leaders; helping plan, implement, evaluate and adapt strategy and tactics to gain influence; and
help set up, prepare for, and conduct meetings with law makers. See Bellow, supra note 207 at
304-05; Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 3 at 320 (discussing the role of lawyers
in negotiating a CBA with Los Angeles city council members); Glick & Rossman, supra note 200
at 119.
213. For example, research, analysis, support, etc. for up-front advocacy, negotiation,
lobbying, community education, etc., by other members of the organization's team. See Glick &
Rossman, supra note 200 at 119 (discussing lawyers roles as tacticians on management teams).
214. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a Law
School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 176-77 (2001).
215. Although a young organization made up largely of current and former welfare
recipients, WRI quickly developed-with support from social work faculty at CUNY's Hunter
College campus-substantial organizational capacity and a skilled full-time staff. See id. at 202204 (describing the growth within the organization and its relationship to the affiliation with the
CUNY clinic).
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counselors; it is involved in the drafting of public education materials and
position papers; it participates in joint community education and training
sessions; and it helped to formulate, draft and negotiate a state legislative
agenda.216 Its primary service involves representing
at administrative hearings
217
WRI.
by
referred
students
individual
of
hundreds
Although the clinic identifies itself at the "legal arm" of WRI, it is more
accurately described as its "partner." The two are separate organizations with a
close, supportive,
mutually
beneficial,
negotiated
attorney-client
relationship. 218 The clinic operates within its own institutional and pedagogic
restraints, and within the limits of student capacity and the academic calendar.
It works mainly "with" rather than "for" WRI, and functions independently in
its main work of representing recipients referred by WRI. 2 19 While exemplary
in many ways, including its use of integrative lawyering roles and mutual
collaboration, the clinic-WRI relationship does not offer a model of lawyers'
full integration into organizational strategy, process and program.
B. OrganizationalIntegration

Collaborative partnerships between community-based organizations and
outside lawyers/firms operate most effectively for discrete legal issues and
policy projects. They are less effective in contributing to the kind of complex,
long-term political-legal-organizing work required to deal with the political
economic roots of persistent patterns of race and class inequality.
Having a lawyer on staff is not necessarily consonant with deeply
integrating a lawyer into the programs and processes of the organization. We
would distinguish between physical integration and functional integration, a
distinction that we think matters to the community efficacy goals of an
organization. It is certainly possible for a lawyer (or group of lawyers) to be
physically integrated into a community organization-i.e. on staff and in the
office-but do work confined to discrete legal tasks performed, for the most
216. See id. at 189-96. Ultimately, the legislature, while not passing all of the reforms
suggested by WRI, passed legislation "that significantly expands welfare recipients' access to
higher education." Id. at 195. Despite opposition by the City government under then-Mayor Rudy

Giuliani the governor signed the bill after significant lobbying and organizing efforts by WRI. See
id. at 195-96.
217.

Though WRI controls referrals, each recipient thereafter becomes a clinic client and

WRI participates no further in her case. See id. at 193 n.88.
218. Note that the Loffredo article, supra note 214, does not focus on the negotiated
structure of the relationship between the clinic and WRI, nor does it discuss whether alternative
arrangements had been proposed and rejected.
219. See Loffredo, supra note 214, at 191-93. Note that the clinic could ethically involve
WRI more if the group's role were specified in the retainer or engagement letter. See JENNIFER
GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 199-200 (2005)
(describing a retainer in which the Workplace Project agreed to provide legal support to a worker
on a particular issue and, in return, the affected worker promised to participate actively in his or
her own case).
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part, separately from other dimensions of the organization's program and
activity. Her work might coalesce at some point with the other strategies and
tactics employed by the organization (e.g. organizing a public hearing to review
a land use plan) but neither the lawyering nor the other strategies are conceived
in a functionally integrative fashion from the outset-the legal strategy is
arrived at separately from the organizing, media, education and other strategies,
rather than collectively through a meeting of the organization's "minds" or its
various operational components. On the other hand, lawyers who are not on an
organization's staff may-through conscious effort by all parties-achieve a
significant degree of close functional collaboration. 220 Our expectation is that
struggles for community efficacy are strongest when legal capacity is integrated
both physically and functionally.
1. PhysicalIntegration
At the simplest level of integration is the in-house counsel model that
corporations, universities, and other major businesses employ to manage
discrete projects or litigation associated with the organization's work and
mission and to retain and supervise outside counsel. This model is designed to
address legal questions, disputes, and issues that arise out of the legal problems
of the organization or its constituents. It is a very "client-centered" model of
lawyering in which the lawyer's presence in the organization is less out of
necessity than efficiency. An outside lawyer might just as easily handle these
matters, but perhaps less seamlessly and with higher transaction costs arising
because she is removed from the flow of information in the office. An inside
lawyer is also available to address relatively minor legal matters, perhaps
involving internal policy or unrealized litigation threats, that otherwise would
remain unaddressed if an outside lawyer had to be retained. However, the inhouse lawyer is not necessarily involved
in broader management decisions and
22 1
other internal operational functions.
220. This is evident in Fordham's work with WE ACT even before the addition of in house
counsel, in much of the CUNY Law-WRI collaboration, and in the work of Brooklyn Legal
Services Corporation A's community development unit. See Loffredo, supra note 214; Glick and
Rossman, supra note 200. An especially impressive example of functional without physical
integration is the work of Margo Feinberg, a labor lawyer in private practice who was retained to

coordinate the legal arm of the multi-faceted community/labor struggle against Wal-Mart analyzed
by Scott Cummings in this colloquium. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement's Challenge to
Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight,95 CALIF L. REV. 1952-54, 1965-72 (2007).
221. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 955, 955 (2005) (describing the evolution of the in-house counsel position and the
amorphous roles these lawyers often play); Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielson, Cops,
Counsel and Entrepreneurs: Constructingthe Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations,34
LAW & Soc'v REv. 457, 462-68 (2000) (discussing three ideal types of in-house counsel: the cop,
who is largely independent of the corporate environment and focuses almost exclusively on legal
gatekeeping; the counselor, who provides advice on ethics, business decisions and situational
concerns, in addition to purely legal matters; and the entrepreneur, who is deeply involved in
business decisions and aggressively leverages legal strategies to increase business profits and
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The in-house counsel model can be, and has been, duplicated within some
community based organizations large enough to employ a lawyer to handle
their internal legal matters, especially housing development corporations.
Another model has been developed by some workplace and multi-issue
community organizing projects to support their efforts to evolve into broadbased participatory membership organizations. In this model, staff lawyers
function primarily to draw potential members to the organization by providing
legal services to resolve their individual problems. These lawyers may offer
services only to members, or at much lower fees to members.2 22 Or they may
offer services contingent upon clients helping with the case and attending
workshops designed to draw people into the organization. 223 In the groups
using this model that we are familiar with, the legal services caseload has been
so great that the lawyers have little time or energy left for more than sporadic,
episodic involvement in organizing and advocacy campaigns, even though the
groups and their lawyers strongly aspire to such functional integration. In both
cases, however, non-practicing attorneys in leadership positions within these
groups provide functionally integrative lawyering in group campaigns.
Physical integration does not necessarily equate with completely stratified
operational or decision making patterns in an organization. In most
organizations, staff members share their goals, strategies, and progress with one
another. Invariably they influence each other, even if unconsciously. Or there
might be, of necessity, more collaborative work between different departments
or experts on particular, complex projects. Purely physical integration, with no
functional integration, is likely a heuristic useful in clarifying the poles of
practice along a continuum, with some groups practicing and aspiring to a
much higher, more consistent degree of functional integration than others.
2. FunctionalIntegration

For models of functional integration useful to WE ACT and its
counterparts, it is most fruitful to look at the work of in house counsel for labor
advance corporate goals); Marc I. Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel in the 1990s: A View
from Outside, 49 SMU L. REv. 483, 494 (1996) (describing the vital role that in-house counsel
plays in providing legal advice and shaping corporate policy, but noting the possible conflict of

interest where in-house counsel serves as a board member involved in broad decision-making); E.

Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional
Responsibilities of the Lawyerfor the Corporation,62 Bus. LAW 1, §1 (2006) (noting the many
roles played by in-house counsel including: legal advisor, business advisor, mediator, compliance
officer, governmental affairs officer, corporate advocate, gatekeeper and ethicist).
222. This approach is employed by Make the Road by Walking, a multi-issue membership

organization based in the Bushwick section of Brooklyn, NY. See Telephone Interview with

Andrew Friedman, Co-Dir., Make the Road by Walking, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 2, 2007); see also
Make the Road by Walking, http://www.maketheroad.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).
223. This approach was used during much of the 1990s by the Workplace Project in Long
Island. See GORDON, supra note 219, at 199-200 (explaining that those who wanted legal

representation from the project were required to participate in the project as well).
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unions, especially during the unions' formative organizing years. Unions are
similar to environmental justice/accountable development groups like WE ACT
in a number of important respects. Both types of groups organize, educate,
mobilize, represent and work to empower a group of people at the bottom of
the economic and political structure. Both frequently have to compete with
rivals for the allegiance of that constituency. Both struggle defensively and proactively in a range of judicial, administrative, regulatory and legislative arenas.
Both need the capacity to bargain effectively for their constituents with
powerful, expertly-staffed, and well-resourced adversaries, and to monitor and
enforce compliance with the resulting agreements.
Like community and CED lawyers, union-side labor lawyers must flexibly
integrate an array of roles. They interpret laws and regulations, participate in
collective bargaining and arbitration, advise on policy, strategy, rights and
obligations, and help structure and administer the union's internal decision
making. They also contribute "considerable non-legal work in the economic,
statistical and public relations fields ...

and help[ ] interpret the union to the

public and to give society a better understanding of the aims, ideals, and
operations of labor organizations., 224 Fortunately for our purposes, we now
of lawyers' work in and with labor unions
have available a number of accounts
225
years.
formative
their
during
The United Farm Workers (UFW) offers an especially propitious model,
since it organized among very poor, politically marginalized people of color
and it uniquely combined a social movement and a trade union in one
organization. Jennifer Gordon's recent comprehensive examination of the work
of the legal department of the United Farm Workers in the 1960s and 1970s
pays close attention to the issues that concern us here. 226 Gordon's article
224. Robert M. Segal, Labor Union Lawyers: Professional Services of Lawyers to
OrganizedLabor, 5 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 343, 363 (1951-52).
225. These accounts include biographies of two progressive lawyers who served as in-

house general counsel to major national industrial unions in the great organizing years of the late

1930s and early 1940s. Maurice Sugar was general counsel to the United Auto Workers from
1937- 1947. See CHRISTOPHER H. JOHNSON, MAURICE SUGAR: LAW, LABOR, AND THE LEFT IN
DETROIT, 1912-1950, at 11 (1988). Lee Pressmen was general counsel to the CIO and its Steel
Workers Organizing Committee (later the United Steelworkers) from 1936 to 1948. See GILBERT
J. GALL, PURSUING JUSTICE: LEE PRESSMAN, THE NEW DEAL, AND THE CIO viii (1999). In
addition, Arthur Kinoy, known mainly for his leading role as an attorney for the 1960s civil rights
movement, devotes a chapter of his autobiography to his work in the late 1940s as in-house
counsel to the United Electrical Workers Union. See ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE
ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S LAWYER (1983). Finally, Carol King's work with labor unions in the
1930s and 1940s is documented in ANN FAGAN GINGER, CAROL WEISS KING: HUMAN RIGHTS

LAWYER, 1895-1952 (1993). For a comprehensive discussion of this tradition of labor lawyering,
see Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers' Legal Strategy in the
1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1,

45 (2005) [hereinafter, Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor].
226. See generally Gordon, Law, Lawyer, and Labor, supra note 225 (discussing the
integrative lawyering strategies employed by the UFW to strengthen organizing efforts, build
political power and create a framework of legally enforceable rights).
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tracks the UFW's early efforts to collaborate with California Rural Legal
Assistance. CRLA was a likely partner as it was (and remains) among the most
progressive and militant of the nation's publicly-funded legal services
programs. 227 It expressed strong commitment to social change and the
empowerment of low-income people. 228 Nonetheless, Gordon explains, "this
collaboration soon unraveled in the face of tension about goals and strategies.
CRLA sought to make decisions about legal tactics that would lead to a victory
in court. The Union, on the other hand, often preferred a course of action that
was riskier in legal terms but that it judged more likely to advance its long-term
organizing goals." 229 CRLA was hampered by federal funding restrictions that
left it unable to take the UFW as a direct client and forced it to assist the union
through representing individual members of the UFW. 230 But its conflicts with
the UFW were deeply rooted in the two organizations' differing institutional
needs and occupational perspectives.
Recognizing that it needed a sophisticated legal strategist to function as
part of its team and serve only its goals, in 1967 the UFW hired its own general
counsel, Jerry Cohen, a young CRLA attorney active in the progressive student
movements of the 1960s.2 3' Over the next thirteen years, working under the
inspired and dynamic leadership of Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta and many
other progressive organizers, Cohen and his staff became an integral arm of the
UFW and contributed greatly to its successes. They cleared the way for the
232
powerful nationwide boycott of grocery chains that sold non-union grapes.
They successfully defended the union, its staff and members against arrests,
evictions, injunctions and myriad other forms of retaliation. They pressured
growers and regulatory agencies, obtained otherwise unavailable strategic data
227. See David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practiceof Law, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 717, 731 (1988).
228. The intensity of its challenge to corporate and state power made CRLA the prime
target of then Governor Reagan's attempts to shut down legal services. See Robert Homstein,
Daniel G. Atkins & Treena A. Kaye, The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 1089, 1094 (2003). Gary Bellow, CRLA's deputy director during this time, was for
many years a prominent leader and national spokesperson for progressive political lawyering. He
published prolifically, including a well-respected textbook. See GARY BELLOW & BEATRICE
MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY

(1978). See also Bellow, supra note 207 passim (discussing Bellow 's distinguished career as a
political lawyer).
229. See Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor, supra note 225, at 14.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 14-15.
232. This is a secondary boycott since the union asked consumers not only to boycott
products grown or manufactured by an employer with which the union has a dispute, but also
broadens the focus, for example, by asking consumers to boycott an entire store because that store
sells the disputed product. Id. at 24-25. Secondary boycotts are banned under the National Labor
Relations Act. See id. at 24. Although the NLRA does not cover farm workers, the UFW did
represent nine workers in a commercial peanut shed who were covered. UFW lawyers created a
new union and moved the nine workers into that union, freeing the UFW to mount what proved to
be one of its most powerful weapons. See id. at 15.
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on growers' operations, and helped build public support by exposing farm
worker conditions and consumer health dangers from growers' illegal practices.
They played a key role in drafting, negotiating, winning and enforcing a
groundbreaking California state labor law, which enabled the UFW to hugely
expand and win major victories.233 Throughout, the lawyers' work added
significantly to the farm workers perceived and real capacity to fight back and
win.
The lawyers' full integration into the UFW was central to this success.
The lawyers were not organized separately into a public interest law firm, law
school clinic or legal services program that worked in partnership with the
UFW. Rather, they labored as part of the union's staff, as its "legal
department." During the harvest season, they lived close to areas where
organizing was most active and were constantly present or on call.
This structural arrangement laid the basis for a more functional, strategic
integration. It enabled the union and its lawyers "to develop an approach to
lawyering that put the achievement of organizing goals above the achievement
of legal victories." 234 The question was not what was legal or what could win
in court, but what did the union need and how could the lawyers help. A losing
lawsuit would be litigated if it could expose the growers' malfeasance,
influence public opinion, obtain helpful data, pressure regulatory agencies, or
provide farm workers with an empowering stage on which to tell their stories.
A winning suit might well be settled or even dropped in exchange for
concessions more valuable to the UFW. An illegal measure by government or
growers might not be legally challenged at all, if some other approach-such as
civil disobedience-might prove more effective at building union and farm
worker power.
These and other decisions were not dictated to or by the lawyers. They
emerged from dialogue and discussion in which the lawyers were fully
engaged. As new lawyers grasped the UFW's approach to law and organizing,
as they gained detailed practical knowledge of the union's methods and the
farm workers' circumstances and built close working relationships with
organizers and workers, they also became participants in determining UFW
strategy and tactics. Cesar Chavez, the union's charismatic leader, came to
consult Jerry Cohen routinely on so many aspects of union policy and strategy
that UFW organizers, after watching the movie "The Godfather," referred to
Cohen as Chavez's "consigliere. 235 Few feared that the lawyers would or
could dominate, publicly or internally, since at the time of the lawyers' arrival,
the UFW was already a well-established organization with strong-minded,
experienced leadership.

233.
234.
235.

See id. at 28-35 (discussing the passage of the ALRA).
Id. at 16.
Id.
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UFW membership surged in the late 1970s after the union won passage
and implementation of California's ground-breaking Agricultural Labor
Relations Act. This new terrain spurred major growth in the size and centrality
of the union's legal department. It also brought into the UFW large numbers of
to
workers who had not been involved in its earlier struggles and ultimately led 236
department.
legal
union's
the
to
end
a complex, contested, and painful
Whatever lessons may emerge from the UFW's later problems, they in no way
detract from the value of the union's approach to law and organizing during the
late 60s and early to mid-70s as a model of integrative lawyering. 237 The
UFW's approach offers an important example for WE ACT and similar
community-based organizations struggling now for environmental justice and
accountable development., There are also contemporary environmental justice
organizations to which WE ACT can, and does, look for guidance on this type
of functional integration.
C. Examplesfrom EnvironmentalJustice Practice
In recent years some environmental justice organizations have begun to
move toward this form of organizational integration as they evolve strategically
and structurally to better attend to present and future development struggles and
to be proactive players in shaping their communities. 238 It is curious that so
236. See Jennifer Gordon, A Movement in the Wake of a New Law: The United Farm
Workers and the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 277, 286-86 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) also available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract-733424 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.733424 Apparently threatened by
his declining control, Chavez won approval from a divided union executive board to fire or drive
out most of the lawyers and younger lead organizers, and the union collapsed at the peak of its
growth. Conflicting explanations abound. Chavez blamed the new law and resulting shift in the
UFW's center of gravity toward lawyers and legal action. Some leading UFW organizers attribute
the collapse more to Chavez's "founder syndrome" and his difficulty sharing leadership and
adapting to the union's new, more bureaucratic and legal circumstances. See Gordon, supra note
219.
237. Another model is provided by the work of Maurice Sugar, who served as general
counsel to the United Auto Workers (UAW), from its formation in 1939 to the ouster of its
progressive founding leaders in 1947. See JOHNSON, supra note 225, at 11, 14. The UAW was at
that time the country's largest union. Id. at 11. In that period, Sugar was an influential member of
the union's national leadership, with a voice in most key decisions. He served as negotiator and
public advocate. He testified at legislative hearings, wrote in Detroit newspapers and was a
popular public speaker. Id. at 52, 60, 168. He played a key role in drafting the UAW's constitution
and ensuring it was applied to protect internal democracy. Id. at 258-59. He was deeply involved
in teaching workers their rights in ways that facilitated organizing. He set up and oversaw the
union's benefits programs and advised union locals on group insurance plans. Id. at 282.
238. These organizations include Alternatives for Community and Environment (ACE),
Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), and the Center on Race, Poverty, and the
Environment (CRPE). See Alternatives for Community and Environment, http://www.ace-ej.org/
(last visited Oct. 3, 2007); Communities for a Better Environment, http://www.cbecal.org/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2007); Center on Race, Poverty, and the Environment, http://www.crpe-ej.org/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2007). We base some of our analysis in this section on conversations with past and
present staff at these three organizations.
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many of the well established environmental justice organizations-Alternatives
for Community and Environment (ACE), Communities for a Better
Environment (CBE), and the Center on Race, Poverty, and the Environment
(CRPE)-were founded by lawyers. Some functioned initially as primarily
legal organizations, moving only gradually--often through their experience
working with grassroots community groups-toward a multi-pronged, multidisciplinary approach that integrates lawyering work with organizing, scientific
research, and media strategies in support of and in partnership with grassroots
community activists and organizations.
The dominant legal beginnings of each of these organizations does raise
the question of how prominent of a role lawyers, and legal strategies, can and
should play in shaping a community-based or broader social justice
organization's strategies and priorities. Lawyer domination has long been a
concern animating the community lawyering literature. 239 For the reasons
stated below, however, we believe that the threat of lawyer domination can be
effectively countered by the process of functional integration. That is,
functional integration is characterized by a deliberative process whereby the
constitutive parts of the organization, as well as its community constituents,
collectively decide how legal strategies and expertise fit into its overall mission
and best advance community efficacy efforts. This deliberative effort would be
severely hampered in a community-based organization where lawyers are
numerically dominant. Even if numerical, and also strategic, lawyer dominance
was a concern in the early days of ACE, CBE, and CRPE, each of these
organizations now operates in a very integrated fashion whereby their lawyers
and legal work are integrated into educational and organizing strategies
designed to support viable community organizations and help communities
"take ownership" of the activities that shape their environments. 240
WE ACT's evolution-from reliance on outside lawyers, to adding a

239.

See GERALD P. LopEz,

REBELLIOUS

LAWYERING:

ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF

PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons Of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Lucie E. White,
Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BuiF. L. REV. 1 (1990).

240. As attorney Luke Cole, head of CRPE explained in one law review article about
CRPE's "power model" of working on behalf of communities battling unhealthy development:
Because of its focus on building power, rather than using the system, the power model
provides a less clear role for the attorney... However, the experience of the Center on
Race, Poverty, and the Environment indicates that a lawyer can still provide valuable
services to a client group within the parameters of the power model. First, the attorney
may know of or have previously represented groups in other communities that have
organized successful campaigns against similar projects. The attorney can direct his or
her clients to these groups for assistance, or develop tactics based on the strategies used
by those other groups. Second, the lawyer may be more familiar with the local power
structure, and thus better able to identify how best to leverage decisionmakers. Finally,
the attorney can counsel his or her clients about the legality of specific protests,
demonstrations, and civil disobedience actions.
Cole, Macho Law Brains,supra note 7, at 702.
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collaborative partnership with Fordham Law School faculty, and finally
combining those with a full-time in-house staff attorney-approaches
integration from the opposite direction. WE ACT is the first non-lawyer group
we are aware of to attempt to integrate legal capacity into a strong, established,
organization that
policy/organizing/advocacy/research
community-based
previously outsourced its legal needs, although other such groups may also be
engaged in this transition and many more are likely to consider doing so in the
near future. Our expectation is that this historical sequence-typified by the
especially effective in
UFW and earlier progressive labor 24unions-is
1
domination.
lawyer
potential
minimizing
In each of the environmental justice organizations, the lawyers still
function mainly as in-house counsel would, i.e., by attending to discrete legal
issues that arise as part of the organization's operations or out of the needs of
groups that the organization supports, assists and partners with and by
242
In this capacity,
organizing and supervising outside legal support as needed.
the lawyers practice role integration in addressing the myriad needs of the
organization and its clients-including transactional, policy, litigation,
negotiation, etc.-and are often in a reactive position largely out of the
necessity of responding to development proposals, siting of particular facilities,
and other specific threats to the group's constituents.
Increasingly, however, lawyers in environmental justice organizations
operate as integrated parts of community-staff teams that might include
organizers, scientists, policy experts, and others. These teams are designed to
change the structure of decision making and accountability that subjects some
communities to adverse development and planning decisions while benefiting
others. Legal strategies thus become part and parcel of larger communitydriven campaigns that are broadly participatory and transformative of the very
legal, political, social and economic dynamics that have given rise to the
community's vulnerability.
One way in which environmental justice organizations integrate their legal
staff across their programs and operations is to work within multidisciplinary
"campaign teams" consisting, most often, of an organizer, lawyer and other
technical staff (such as a scientist).243 The focus of these campaign teams is
241. Some participants in the April 2007 Boalt Hall Law School symposium on the articles
in this colloquium expressed concern that a previously non-lawyer group might tend to over-rely
on its new legal capacity to the detriment of its overall effort. In theory, this is a risk to which an
organization must be attentive. However, we see no evidence of this problem in the UFW
experience or at WE ACT so far, and we believe and are hopeful that any such inclination easily
can be overcome by politically astute and experienced organizational leaders and lawyers.
242. Sometimes, however, discrete legal issues can lead to a larger campaign, or effort, to
change the political economic dynamics surrounding a source of harm in a vulnerable community.
243. The information in this paragraph has been culled from the authors' conversations
with lawyers on the staff of three environmental justice organizations-CBE, CRPE, and ACE.
See Telephone Interview with Adrienne Bloch, Staff Attorney, CBE, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 2, 2007);
Interview with Eugene B. Benson, Legal Counsel, ACE, in Boston, Mass. (Feb. 1, 2007);
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determined through a deliberative process involving the organization's staff
and the relevant community or communities with which they work. The focus
might involve a development threat to the community. It might be helping the
community intervene effectively in the local government's process of updating
its general plan. the results of which will significantly impact the community
and from which its voices have been historically excluded. Once the team
identifies the campaign's focus, it begins an ongoing dialogue among its
members and between its members and the community to strategize and chart a
course of action that will effectuate the community's goals. The lawyer's role
within a particular campaign, and campaign team, is largely determined
organically through the ongoing deliberative process and can call upon the
variety of skills/roles that community lawyers are accustomed to utilizing.
What is important about the deliberative process between community
representatives and the different facets of organizational expertise is not
necessarily what role the lawyer assumes, but rather how that role is
determined-through a process of deliberative integration. This integration will
look slightly different at different times in different organizations. Some may
use the previously discussed "campaign teams" and others less formal ways of
integrating its multi-disciplinary expertise. But what each of these
environmental justice groups ultimately have in common is their integration of
organizational roles, strategies and expertise toward the goal of increasing
community efficacy-i.e., maximizing the capacity and ability of socially and
economically vulnerable communities (or populations) to develop a shared
244
vision of their future and the means of achieving that vision.
We have not attempted a full survey of integrative lawyering within
environmental justice and accountable development organizations, let alone in
the broader realm of social justice groups. As more groups experiment with
organizationally integrated legal capacity, a broader survey and analysis would
be helpful. Data that could fruitfully be gathered and analyzed include not only
the gains, limits and problems encountered (and how they are dealt with) but
also the impact on the quality of the experience for the groups and lawyers of
such factors as: whether organizational integration was physical, functional or
both, whether the group was founded and is led by lawyers or non-lawyers,
their ratio and positions in the group, the extent to which the group functions as
a community organization or a resource for community groups, the size of the
group and scale of its operations (staff, budget, etc.), the roles assumed by the
staff attorneys, the background, training and political orientation they bring,
their race, class and gender in comparison to those of the group's staff and
constituents, and the legal back-up and community available to the staff
lawyers.
Telephone Interview with Carline Farrell, Managing Attorney, CRPE, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 6,

2007).
244.

See ALBERT BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL (1997).
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D. Bringing Integrative Strategies into WE A CT's Columbia Expansion
Campaign
To fill some of the shortcomings in their existing (and largely productive)
relationship, WE ACT and Fordham sought funds for a full-time in-house staff
attorney, to be based at WE ACT and fully integrated into its staff and work, so
that legal research, analysis, and action could inform and enhance all aspects of
the group's planning and action. Fordham planned to stay as involved, if not
more so, providing student, faculty and resource support, summer students and,
hopefully, post-graduate public interest fellows. Their joint proposal won a
nationwide funding competition for racial justice law and organizing projects
and was the only proposal in the competition to place an attorney on the staff of
a non-lawyer organization.
In Fall 2005, WE ACT's in-house counsel began work and, while taking
on assignments in a number of the organization's program areas, immediately
became steeped in strategic discussions and organizational choices over how
best to incorporate community interests into the Columbia development plan.
The attorney brought a profound understanding of WE ACT's approach to law
and organizing, having worked extensively as a law student for a leading West
Coast proponent of a similar approach. 245 As work around Columbia's
expansion ramped up, the new attorney and Fordham worked to iron out their
respective roles and by Fall 2006, the new arrangement began to show its
potential value in the context of community response to Columbia's expansion.
The evolution of the in-house lawyer's integration into the organization
was uneven, yet, of necessity, swift, given the pace of the Columbia expansion
project. Although WE ACT's outside lawyers, including Fordham faculty and
students, had been careful to work closely with all of WE ACT staff in
coordinating legal strategy with other elements of the organization's operation,
there were inherent limitations to how enmeshed they could be, given their
limited commitment of time and energy and their physical absence from the
almost daily strategic discussions occurring at WE ACT. The Fordham CED
Clinic, which had become WE ACT's main lawyering partner in relation to the
Columbia expansion as well as internal transactional matters, while deeply
committed to functional integration, had additional limits. Students pass
through the clinic, staying only one semester or at best a year, making it
difficult to develop the trust and mutual understanding required for genuine
integration. They take several courses simultaneously and often have law
journal work, paid work or other responsibilities. They are not available during
the summer or on break, and they spend their first weeks in the clinic preparing
for field work and their last weeks focused on exams and papers for other
classes. Above all, the clinic is a teaching as well as a service institution. The
245. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. As an added bonus, she was a biology
Ph.D. who knew the underlying science and was skilled in breaking it down for a lay audience.

2070

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1999

pace of work, the concern for helping students develop as lawyers, the need for
students and faculty to participate in the law school community and meet their
institutional obligations all serve to constrain their contribution to WE ACT
and their ability to fully integrate into its work. The in-house attorney, on the
other hand, has been able to function not only as a traditional legal
advocate/strategist but also as a central participant in the organization's overall
program and strategy to develop community power and, ultimately, community
accountability and ownership structures. Her presence enables WE ACT to
make far more effective use of the resources available from Fordham.
1. The Evolution ofIntegrativeLawyering at WE ACT
At the most traditional advocacy level, while deeply involved in a range
of program areas, WE ACT's in-house attorney initially focused much of her
time and energy on preparing the extensive, detailed comments that WE ACT
submitted to the City Planning Commission in early 2006 criticizing
Columbia's draft scope of the EIS required for City approval of the zoning
changes needed for its proposed expansion. 246 As of Summer 2007 she was
engaged in drafting a similar critique of Columbia's draft EIS, coordinating
preparation of WE ACT's ULURP testimony, and preparing possible litigation
challenging the University's final EIS once that document is approved by the
CPC. 247 At the broadest level of advocacy, she is (along with Fordham faculty
and students) actively engaged in a continuing dialogue with WE ACT's
organizing staff, and through them, as well as directly, with community
stakeholders. The goal is both to educate the stakeholders about the ongoing
legal and political processes in preparation for their testifying, negotiating and
lobbying and to elicit from them ideas and information that can influence
negotiation demands, policy, and project proposals.
The new attorney's organizational integration enabled her to take the
Fordham's CED students' community legal education work to a new level. The
students had previously prepared bi-lingual handouts and presentations on
decision processes, participation rights, community benefits agreements, and
the programs that other major universities undertook when expanding into
nearby communities. The new attorney worked with WE ACT's organizing and
program staff to develop a series of Fordham CED clinic workshops that were
integrated more deeply into WE ACT's overall efforts. A leader from each
participating tenant association and community group met with the students and
WE ACT staff to plan the sessions. The leaders brought activists from their
groups to the subsequent workshops. At those sessions, Fordham law students
helped residents to grasp the legal process, focus their grievances and
246. See WE ACT, Official Written Comments, supra note 24.
247. See Hell's Kitchen Neighborhood Ass'n, supra note 140. The court noted in that case
that if and when final approval is granted, petitioners may subject the process as a whole to
judicial review. See id.
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proposals, and prepare to testify at public hearings. Much of the emphasis was
on helping the leaders and activists, in turn, to educate and mobilize their
constituents. CBA discussions in the workshops elicited a rich array of
proposed community benefits, especially in improving local public education.
In Spring 2007, clinic students began working with workshop participants
on presentations and discussions at general tenant association meetings.
Together they worked to recruit and prepare residents to testify at ULURP
hearings and play other roles in lobbying City officials and developing
community proposals for the CBA negotiations.
The in-house attorney was also central to WE ACT's effort to build a citywide coalition and launch a legislative campaign for bio-research transparency,
public participation and community oversight. WE ACT is attempting to forge
a middle ground. On the one side, Columbia and other research institutions
demand freedom from any oversight and complete secrecy despite major public
funding. They are largely supported by City and State governments pushing for
uncontrolled expansion in biotechnology as an engine of economic growth. On
the other hand, the Coalition to Preserve Community and similar groups fan
community paranoia and seek to ban any form of bio-research in urban areas,
even HIV/AIDS laboratory research that poses negligible risks and offers
enormous potential benefit to residents of Harlem and other neighborhoods
where HIV/AIDS is widespread. 248 WE ACT seeks a regime which would
allow useful low-risk research with community access to full information and
expert monitoring. Any potentially risky research would be subject to
government approval after full disclosure and public discussion, possibly under
a procedure similar to ULURP.
2. Lawyeringfor Community Efficacy
The next stage of integration is currently ongoing as the in-house lawyer
and the Fordham clinic work to connect WE ACT's advocacy, education,
policy and lobbying to the creation of new structures for community ownership
of land, housing and community facilities. This is where the lawyering aspect
of the organization's work fuses the most with its other goals and works to
enhance community capacity and power. A major focus for WE ACT has been
to identify, develop and promote solutions that address the ways in which its
community has been rendered vulnerable to development practices that are not
in its interests.
248. Columbia's proposal to include major biological research facilities in its West Harlem
campus has alarmed the community. The university has said it will not research dangerous viruses
such as anthrax or Ebola ("BSL-4") and will sign a CBA to that effect, but has not included such a
restriction in its proposed re-zoning. The BSL-3 research that Columbia does plan requires a more
nuanced community response since it covers not only lethal airborne viruses like SARS but also
HIV/AIDS research which poses no risks and offers enormous potential benefit to Harlem
residents. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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In the context of its Columbia expansion work, WE ACT has struggled to
develop and promote CBA proposals that would require the University to
provide major financial, staff and resource support for improving West
Harlem's public schools and health clinics. These are consistently the primary
needs voiced by community residents. 249 WE ACT's legal team had
helped bring innovative local school administrators and activists together
with WE ACT and outside experts experienced in helping community groups
organize, reform, or self-operate and vastly improved public schools. 250 They
are working to identify similar consultants on healthcare, housing and other key
CBA issues on which WE ACT lacks adequate in-house expertise.
WE ACT's lawyers and law students are in constructive dialogue with its
policy team and members of the community to learn about and develop the
concept and mechanisms of community ownership as a means of developing a
community asset base. WE ACT's in-house lawyer has been essentially staffing
the LDC environmental working group and drafted its detailed platform. In
Winter 2007 Fordham students began to play similar roles, on behalf of WE
ACT, within the LDC groups responsible for the key areas of housing, schools,
jobs and healthcare ("community facilities and services") .25 l They were also
looking into ways to use Columbia funds and City subsidies and services to
underwrite tenant co-op purchase of the Riverside Park Community across the
street from the expansion footprint 252 so it could remain affordable to current
residents.25 3 With a City Council decision on Columbia's expansion expected
early in 2008, the next months would test the community's capacity to unite
behind and fight for a CBA that wins important gains. WE ACT and its legal
team were positioned to make a leading contribution. In the process, they
would forge new modes of integrative lawyering that could help guide WE
ACT and its counterparts over years and struggles to come.
249. Among the country's leaders in training teachers, school administrators, doctors and
public health professionals, Columbia has the capacity in-house to provide such benefits on a
grand scale, including local asthma and AIDS clinics and reduced or no-tuition admission into the
University for local students who do well in the schools it sponsors. Such benefits offer a win-win
synergy in which the University gains practical educational opportunities for its graduate students
in the course of helping the community. They are among the main benefits that other major urban
universities have provided to neighboring communities during periods of expansion.
250. See http://www.annenberginstitute.org/CIP/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007)
(describing work of the Community Involvement Program of the Annenberg Institute for School
Reform, a New York City affiliate of Brown University).

251. In its involvement in the LDC, and in educational presentations to tenant associations
and community activists, the legal team is taking great care to be clear that its client is WE ACT
and that it is not forming an attorney client relationship with any other group or individual. On the
danger of inadvertently forming such a relationship, and similar legal ethical issues in community
lawyering, see Shauna 1. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7
CLINICAL LAW REV. 147 (2000).
252. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
253. New York City offers purchase and operating subsidies and some supportive services.
See Co-op Conversion Program, N.Y. CITY Hous. DEV. CORP., available at

http://www.nychdc.com/pdf/developers/coopconversion-termsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).

